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ESTRAGON: All my lousy life I've crawled about in the mud!
And you talk to me about scenery! (Looking
wildly about him.) Look at this muckheap!
I've never stirred from it!
VLADIMIR: Calm yourself, calm yourself.
ESTRAGON: You and your landscapes! Tell me about the
worms!
-Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot
Public land-use decisions regularly confer substantial bene-
fits on some individuals while imposing significant burdens on
others.' Landowners become richer or poorer as a consequence
of public decisions; values are transferred from one landowner
to another, or new values created. The following examples are
typical:
The Zoning Amendment 2-Herbert and Eleanor own ident-
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bach, Mike Becker, and Morris Clark for their helpful comments and
continuing willingness to listen and react.
1. Benefits or burdens are conferred or imposed on land not only
through the regulatory process, but also by governmental provision of
services to landowners, such as sewer and water service, schools, and
parks. This Article will emphasize the benefit-burden aspects of the reg-
ulatory process, although occasionally touching on the other areas of gov-
ernment activity. In a forthcoming sequel to this Article, I shall deal
more completely with provision of services, and such issues as special
assessments and subdivision exactions.
2. See, e.g., Montgomery County Council v. Pleasants, 266 Md. 462,
295 A.2d 216 (1972).
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ical, contiguous 10-acre tracts in a rapidly developing sub-
urb. Both are zoned for single-fiamily residential use with a
one-acre minimum lot size, and have been so zoned since well
before Herbert and Eleanor acquired them. The tracts were
acquired for $1000 per acre and are now worth about $2000 per
acre for the designated single-family use. The municipality
recently determined to authorize a 10-acre development of mul-
tiple-family dwellings by a single owner under a planned unit
development scheme. After receiving applications from both
Herbert and Eleanor, the village council rezoned Eleanor's tract.
This action increased the value of her land to $10,000 per acre
and reduced the value of Herbert's land to the extent that its
original value reflected the probability of rezoning for multiple-
family use, and to the extent its utility for single-family use was
reduced because of its proximity to the newly authorized devel-
opment. Eleanor has received a substantial economic benefit
for which she has paid nothing except the cost of utilizing the
administrative or legislative process. 3
The Nonconforming Use4-A municipality decides to
adopt comprehensive zoning for the first time, and in so doing
chooses a partially developed area for residential designation.
The area is nearly all residential now, with the exception of a
grocery store. The grocery has thus achieved the status of a
local monopoly by having become a nonconforming use not re-
quired to comply with the new ordinance. Acting out of zealous
regard for the property rights of the individual grocer, the gov-
ernment has conferred substantial economic benefit upon him to
the detriment of his customers and of other grocers who might
desire to locate in the area.
Overzoning 5 -Secluded Pines is a partially developed resi-
dential locality. Half of its land has been developed with single-
family homes on one-acre lots. The other half is owned by
developers who wish to develop on a similar basis. The resi-
dents limit development by imposing a three-acre minimum lot
3. Unless, under one version of tlis story, she had to pay someone
off for the favorable decision.
4. See, e.g., W. Himscn, URBAN Eco:NomWc ANALYSis 423 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415,
appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 143 (1959); County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md.
355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560,
42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). See generally 0. Davis, The Economics of Munici-
pal Zoning 135-37 (1960) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Econom-
ics Department, University of Virginia); Davis, Economic Elements in
Municipal Zoning Decisions, 39 LAND ECON. 375, 379-83 (1963).
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size on the undeveloped land, even though their gain from the
restriction falls far below the cost (in market value decline)
forced on the developers. Moreover, their action imposes addi-
tional housing costs on persons residing outside Secluded Pines.
Thus the residents, acting through their local government, have
redistributed wealth from others to themselves, and in so doing
have frustrated the goal of efficiency in the metropolitan housing
market.
Swamp Preservation6 -Stanley Flug bought a lot alongside a
lake some 10 years ago, hoping to construct a residence on it
some day. His neighbors (who have already constructed lake-
side residences or own land not bordering directly on the lake)
have joined with nearby city dwellers to enact an ordinance that
declares Stanley's tract to be "designated wetland." By this law,
landfill operations, which are prerequisite to construction on the
plot, are banned. Stanley receives no compensation for his lost
value, while substantial gains have accrued to his neighbors in
the increased values of their lots.
The Disappointed First User 7-Twenty years ago, Ralph
Pruitt opened a brickyard on the outskirts of town in an area
that was undeveloped and unzoned. Today the brickyard is
surrounded by residences, and the owners' complaints about
noxious fumes from the brickyard have led the municipality to
pass an ordinance forbidding the operation of brickyards in
residential areas. The ordinance forces Ralph to close, reducing
his land value from $500,000 to $30,000. Ralph receives no
compensation, while his neighbors enjoy gratuitous increases in
the value of their tracts.
Aestheticss-Emily Florale owns a private, detached house
in a neighborhood of such houses. She recently decided to paint
her house with a coat of purple and orange stripes, only to find
that her neighbors objected and complained to the local zoning
6. E.g., compare Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Town-
ship of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) and State
v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) with just v. Marinette County, 56
Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CAL-
iIES & J. BANTA, Tm TAKING ISSUE 214-29 (1973). See also Note, State
and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking Without Just
Compensation, 58 VA. L. REv. 876, 881-82 (1972).
7. E.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
8. See, e.g., People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119
Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
1976]
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administrator, who informed her that gross nonconformities in
exterior syle are banned by a local ordinance. Her immediate
neighbors would have sustained a 10 percent reduction in the
value of their houses had she been permitted to paint in accord-
ance with her stylistic preferences. Emily's friend, a realtor, has
told her that she should be happy that her plans were blocked,
since the painting would also have reduced the market value of
her own house.
Highway Construction9 -For 20 years Albert Rogle has
operated a filling station alongside Old Main Road. Recently
his business has collapsed with the completion of the new Super-
way, an interchange of which happens to be adjacent to the land
of Ronald Groad, who has just decided to open a filling station
on his plot. Ronald, who paid almost nothing for his lot, has
received a windfall gain. Albert, whose land and business have
become worthless, receives no compensation.
In each of these typical situations, someone appears to be
getting something at the expense of someone else. The benefits
received, as well as the burdens imposed, may be reducible to an
objective economic measure-change in land value-and may
also be expressed in terms of subjective personal reactions of
satisfaction or disappointment. In each case, the benefits or
burdens are being imposed through government action. The
premise of this Article is that government actions that impose
significant burdens or confer significant benefits should be taken
in accordance with a rational scheme-that there should exist
some ethically satisfying criteria to which one can appeal to
justify the particular benefits or burdens. It is the goal of this
Article to explore and develop an ethical framework for testing
land-use regulations.
Part I will examine the theoretical basis for governmen-
tal intervention to regulate land use, suggesting that even against
a background of private possessory ownership of land, some
collective intervention is necessary to cope with the inevitable
9. E.g., compare People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799
(1943) with People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d
217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960) and Los Angeles v. Geiger,
94 Cal. App. 2d 180, 210 P.2d 717 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949). See D. HAG-
MAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELoPAENT
790-91 (1973); Bruhn, Zoning-Its Effect on Property Value, 37 APPRAIS-
AL J. 555, 559 (1969); Finley, Partners in Profit: A Financial Break-
through for Local Governments, 3 LAND USE CONTROLS Q., No. 4, at 21
(1969). See generally Waite, Property and Just Compensation, 2 URBAN
L. ANN. 43 (1969).
[Vol. 60:883
LAND-USE REGULATION
conflicts between users of privately owned land. Part I will
further suggest that the necessary process of governmental regu-
lation can most aptly be characterized as distribution of a prop-
erty right which is separate from that pertaining to basic owner-
ship of the land and which I shall call "local environmental
control."
Part II will propose a conceptual structure for governmen-
tal distribution of local environmental control. Three criteria
for distribution will be analyzed-market efficiency, intrinsic
merit, and prior appropriation. Part III will examine the roles
played by the three suggested criteria in the traditional method
of public intervention-post hoc judicial decisions under the
common law of nuisance. That section will conclude with a
discussion of the failure of nuisance law to further the values
ostensibly promoted by its mix of the three criteria. I will
suggest that the shortcomings of nuisance law can be overcome
only through some form of prospective public allocation of local
environmental control.
Part IV will examine the "taking" controversy in order to
see how the rules for determining takings (as contrasted with
permissible "regulations") have allocated property rights in local
environmental control, in order to describe the difference be-
tween possessory claims and spillover claims, and, especially, in
order to consider the relationship between the taking issue and
nuisance law in light of the proposed distributional criteria.
Part V will focus on zoning as the principal method of
public allocation of land uses. The same criteria will be investi-
gated in the context of zoning law to compare the value choices
made in zoning with those that seemed implicit in nuisance
doctrine. I shall conclude that zoning, while it is a necessary
form of intervention, has, as currently employed, legitimized
gross inefficiency, warped the egalitarian values of nuisance law
into a rigid aristocratic hierarchy, and elevated prior appropria-
tion claims to an unwarranted level.
I. LAND-USE SPILLOVERS: THE NEED
FOR PUBLIC INTERVENTION
Land uses often make spillover demands on the surround-
ing environment. If you build a house on your land, you can
retain residential peace and quiet only by forcing all of your
neighbors to use their land in a similar fashion, even if your
neighbors would prefer to build stores or factories. On the
1976]
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other hand, if you build a store or factory, you are forcing your
neighbors to use their land in some way that will not be offended
by your noises, odors, or other by-products. Each of these
demands amounts to an imposition on neighbors that extends
the impact of your property right beyond your territorial bor-
ders. The imposition takes the form of a request that your
neighbor accept from you a measure of subjection and exclu-
sion-subjection in the sense that your neighbor must accept the
burden of your activity to the extent it causes him discomfort (or
conform his own activities so as to minimize the discomfort),
and exclusion in the sense that you are excluding from your
neighbor's range of choices those activities that will be offensive
to you. Each party to the land-use conflict is seeking a measure
of control over the local environment. The subject matter of
land-use regulation is the distribution of this local environmental
control.'0
If only to avoid chaos, some collective intervention is neces-
sary to choose among competing claimants for local environ-
mental control. Absent collective intervention (or, at a mini-
mum, collective agreement on the appropriate criteria for
resolution of the conflicts and on application of those criteria to
particular cases), users of land might well be able to establish
their claims to environmental control by means of force. Non-
intervention would thus amount to a collective decision (nonde-
cision?) to distribute such environmental claims to those who
could take them and hold them.
A further justification for intervention comes from market
economics. Claims of local environmental control amount to
what economists refer to as spillover effects, or "external dise-
conomies." 11 External diseconomies have traditionally been re-
10. Another kind of land-use regulation that should be distin-
guished from distribution of local control rights is the pervasive variety,
where regulations set maximum limits of imposition on common re-
sources such as air quality, water quality, or quiet. This Article will
emphasize the local control category, although occasionally touching on
common resource problems.
11. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, WELFARE EcoNolucs AND THE THEORY OF
STATE 29-30, 31, 56, 72, 126-27, 180-82 (2d ed. 1965); M. CLAWSON,
SUBURBAN LAND CoNvERsIoN IN THE UmITED STATES 166-80 (1971); F.
HAYEK, THE CoNsTITTIoN OF LIrERTY 349-50 (1960); K. KAPP, THE So-
cIAL CosTs OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 223-25 (1950); Bator, The Anatomy of
Market Failure, 72 Q.J. EcoN. 351 (1958); Baumol, On Taxation and the
Control of Externalities, 62 A.m. EcoN. 1b.v. 307 (1972); Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960); Davis, Economic Elements
in Municipal Zoning Decisions, 39 LAN ECON. 375 (1963); Dunham, A
Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650
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garded as an obstacle to the attainment of what economists call
"efficiency." The allocation of resources is efficient when ra-
tional, self-maximizing individuals operating through a competi-
tive market structure have reached the point where no further
allocation changes will make some individual better off without
making someone else worse off. If a firm is imposing an
external diseconomy on another firm or consumer under circum-
stances where the cost imposed by such a diseconomy is not
reflected in the first firm's computation of costs, the firm may
well, in terms of efficiency, be overproducing, for the true
marginal cost of its product, which includes the marginal cost of
the external diseconomy, would be higher than the price of the
good.1 2 To say that the firm should take into account the cost
of the external diseconomy in making its output decision is to
say that the right to impose the diseconomy should be pur-
chased, like any other factor of production, from some owner of
that factor. On the other hand, if the initial property right (the
claim on the local environment) belonged to the firm, a recipro-
cal (though not necessarily identical) 13 solution of efficiency
would occur if affected individuals could purchase some or all of
(1958); Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpreta-
tive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1971); E.J. MISHAN, Reflections on Recent
Developments in the Concept of External Effects, in WELFARE EcoNom-
Ics: TEN INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS 180 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
WELFARE ECONOmICS ]; Mohring & Boyd, Analysing "Externalities": "Di-
rect Interaction" vs. "Asset Utilization" Frameworks, 38 ECONOMICA (New
Series) 347 (1971); Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.
LAw & ECON. 427 (1972); Wellisz, On External Diseconomies and the
Government-Assisted Invisible Hand, 31 ECONONIICA (New Series) 345
(1964).
12. See, e.g., J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AN PRICES 61-63 (pa-
perback ed. 1968); E.J. MxsHAN, Reflections on Recent Developments in
the Concept of Externalities, in WELFARE eCONOMncs, supra note 11, at
180, 181-82.
13. If any given distribution of wealth produces a unique efficient
allocation of resources, it would seem that since the conferral of the
claim on the environment to one activity or another involves a choice
between alternative distributions of wealth, that the resultant efficient
solution might be different in each case, or at least when the conflicting
land users are consumers rather than firms. For some debate on the
matter, compare A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY:
EcONoMIcS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 87 (1968); Mohring & Boyd,
Analysing "Externalities": "Direct Interaction" vs "Asset Utilization"
Frameworks, 38 ECONOMCA (New Series) 347, 358-60 (1971); and Regan,
The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. LAw & ECON. 427, 432-33
(1972) with Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Lia-
bility Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAw & EcoN. 67 (1968); Demsetz, When
Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 13 (1972); and




that property right from the firm through exchange transactions
agreeable to all parties.
Economic efficiency, if it is to be achieved through market
structure alone, requires exchange transactions, and exchange
transactions are contingent on exchangeable property rights. As
with other property rights, property rights in local environmen-
tal control can only be defined, distributed, exchanged, and pro-
tected by means of some collective intervention. While the effi-
ciency rationale may mandate an assignment of rights to local
environmental control, that rationale alone offers no guidance
as to the appropriate criteria for distribution. In fact, as Ronald
Coase suggested in his now-famous article,'1 4 the question of to
whom the rights are initially distributed is irrelevant to whether
an efficient allocation of resources will result, so long as bargain-
ing is costless and the parties may engage in exchange transac-
tions. Regardless of who initially receives the right, under this
scheme the parties will bargain to the point where efficiency is
achieved.
From an efficiency standpoint, then, the important ques-
tion is whether excessive costs will preclude otherwise favorable
exchange transactions. Such costs may include the costs of
organizing (where more than one individual is involved on
either side), the costs of excluding freeloaders (persons desiring
the benefit of the transaction but hoping to get it for nothing),
the costs flowing from imperfect information about the nature of
the particular spillover effect, and the costs of dealing with
holdouts from among the group of would-be sellers. The aggre-
gate of these "transactions" costs creates the danger that the
initial assignment of the local environmental control right will be
final. 15 To the extent that transactions costs do operate as a
serious obstacle to successful exchanges, then the efficiency goal
can be best served only if the public decision-making body
14. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
15. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-
98, 1101 (1972); Schmid, Market Failure--Why Externalities Are Not Ac-
counted for in the Market, in C. MEERS & A.D. TARLOcK, SELECTED
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 18 (1970).
The point is not that transactions costs will always be so high as to pre-
clude the possibility of exchange solutions to land-use conflicts, but that
the case for a market solution to such problems, on efficiency grounds
alone, is substantially weakened by the potential presence of such costs,
with the result that if there are other gcod reasons for preferring a non-
market solution, such arguments cannot be simply answered by an asser-
tion that a market solution would clearly lead to an efficient allocation.
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responsible for assigning the rights initially does so in the man-
ner best suited to attaining efficiency.
Subject to the one constraint just mentioned, the efficiency
rationale for assignment of local environmental control rights
fails to imply any distributional criteria. In addition, the very
process of distributing these rights may reflect societal values
other than economic efficiency. Each time a conflict between
competing land users is resolved, one or the other receives a
measure of subjection and exclusion over the adversary. That
right amounts to a relative advantage for the land of the winner
(or, at least, the land of the winner for a particular use) as
against the land of the loser. The relative advantage becomes
an increment of land value attaching to the already owned land
of the victor, with a corresponding decrease in the value of the
loser's land.-" Thus the public decision to assign a local control
right amounts to a public distribution of wealth to those selected
as beneficiaries. The question of criteria appropriate for the
distribution of these rights, then, seems to involve a larger
question of appropriate criteria for the distribution to private
parties of publicly owned assets. If achievement of societal
goals other than efficiency is sought when a publicly owned asset
is distributed to members of the public, resolution of land-use
conflicts offers an occasion for achievement of such goals.
To say that, until distributed, local control rights are pub-
licly owned implies not only the necessity of public intervention
to resolve the conflicts, but also that previously existing property
rights do not already include local control rights. For, if they
did, the public distributional role might be limited to legitimiz-
ing preexisting local control claims by simply assigning them to
the appropriate landowner claimants. The naked fact of land
ownership, however, does not seem to resolve the typical land-
use conflict that gives rise to the competing claims for extraterri-
torial control. The most basic of such conflicts involves two
landowners; if land ownership alone is to be the basis for
resolving the conflict, neither claimant seems preferable. It may
be that there is some feature of a particular landowner or land
use that supports an appealing claim for a local control right,
but such a characterization of the problem returns us to the
16. See Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J.
LEGAL STums 13, 22-25 (1972). Whether, and how much, the loser's land
is likely to decline in value will depend upon the extent to which its




problem of selecting appropriate criteria,17 which is the principal
subject of the next section.
II. DISTRIBUTING LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK18
A. TmE VALUES TO BE SERVED
If local environmental control rights are to be distributed to
landowners, three kinds of rules must be developed. First, the
rights to be distributed must be defined and categorized. Sec-
ond, rules for the distribution of those rights must be established
in order to enable decisionmakers to choose among competing
claimants. Third, rules for the subsequent management of the
distributed rights are needed to facilitate exchange and to resolve
conflicts between holders of the previously distributed rights.
Before dealing with each of these problems, however, it seems
necessary to articulate the values to be served by the entire
system of distribution.
17. For a discussion of these questions in the context of the tradi-
tional "taking" issue in constitutional law see Part IV infra.
18. Instead of attempting to attribute specific sentences or ideas to
specific sources in this section, I offer the following citations as a bibli-
ographic footnote to all of Part II. The list is not intended to be ex-
haustive, but rather to suggest through my sources the perspective from
which I approached this section. The listed items are all ones that I
found particularly stimulating, thought-provoking and/or inspiring:
0. Davis, The Economics of Municipal Zoning (1960) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Economics Department, University of Virginia);
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules., Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960); Demsetz,
When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 13 (1972);
Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 3. LEGAL
STumEs 223 (1972); Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Plan-
ning, 58 CoLum. L. REV. 650 (1958); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L.
REv. 681 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ellickson]; Michelman, Foreword:
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv.
L. REv. 7 (1969); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Michelman]; E.J. MIsHAN, Pareto
Optimality and the Law, in WELFARE EcoNoMWcS, supra note 11, at 225;
Mohring & Boyd, Analysing "Externalities": "Direct Interaction" vs
"Asset Utilization" Frameworks, 38 ECONOMICA (New Series) 347 (1971);
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971); Tarlock, Toward a Revised Theory of Zoning, 1972 LAND USE
CONTROLS ANN. 141 (1973); Thurow, Toward a Definition of Economic
Justice, THE PuBLic INTEREST, Spring 1973, at 56; Tribe, Policy Science:
Analysis or Ideology, 2 PmIosoPHY & Pus,. AFFAIs 66 (1972).
[Vol. 60:883
LAND-USE REGULATION
By values I mean those underlying justifications to which
the defender of a particular scheme of distribution would
appeal. If such a scheme is justifiable, it should be possible to
say that those who have received local control rights deserve
them. Three notions occur to me as possible bases for making
such a claim of desert-efficiency, merit, and prior appropria-
tion.
1. Efficiency
I cited efficiency earlier as a sufficient basis for justifying
the decision to set up a scheme of distributing local control
rights. The efficiency value appeals to the idea that we should
make the most out of what we have, given that what we have is
limited in quantity. I relied on this idea above' 9 to suggest that
maximizing the value of land resources compels the distribution
of extraterritorial claims to landowners. The question for the
moment is whether the efficiency value offers any guidance with
respect to the selection of a comprehensive distributional
scheme.
In one sense, efficiency is irrelevant to the choice of such a
scheme. An efficient allocation of resources can be achieved for
any particular distribution of wealth among individuals. All
that is necessary is that the individuals be able to express their
preferences, backed up by the wealth that each possesses,
through exchange transactions with other individuals. If all that
is involved in the distribution of local control rights is a distribu-
tion of wealth, then the possibility of a subsequent efficient
allocation of that resource would not depend on the original
basis of distribution. If some individuals received too much or
too little of the resource in the initial distribution, exchange
transactions would soon reallocate in accordance with wealth-
backed expressions of preference.
If, however, there is reason to suspect that exchange trans-
actions will not occur, efficiency becomes much more relevant to
the question of initial distribution. To the extent that we fear
that initial distribution of a resource will be final, we may prefer
to distribute the resource initially through a pricing system, to
ensure accurate satisfaction of individual preferences. The
more the scheme of distribution facilitates subsequent ex-
changes, however, the less important the efficiency value will be
19. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
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in choosing the initial recipients and the easier it will be to
promote other values in the initial distribution. More specifical-
ly, if the definitional rules and the subsequent management rules
can be squared with the demands of efficiency, the distributional
rules can be liberated from that constraint.
2. Merit
The merit value suggests that there may be some feature of
an individual activity or person, apart from preference expressed
through dollars, that makes that activity or person peculiarly
deserving of local environmental control rights. It should be
recalled at this point that the property right to be distributed
arises in a situation of conflict, and, by definition, involves the
assignment to the recipient of an ability to subject or exclude
other landowners.20 In exploring the merit value, then, the focus
should be on the likely parties to the conflict. One way of
characterizing a land-use conflict is individual versus individual.
Without more, is Sam Jones or Herb Glork more entitled to an
award of the property right? Since the names hardly imply
any criteria of desert, we do need to know something more. But
what? On an intuitive level at least, the relative niceness of
Sam and Herb might serve as a satisfactory index of merit, but
could niceness be determined on a scale satisfactory to all con-
cerned? Could anyone be trusted to make that decision? With-
out belaboring the point, I will suggest that whatever merit
criteria are to be found will reside in the kinds of land-use
activities involved rather than the personal characteristics of
the claimants.
With respect to land-use activities, private land uses may be
roughly divided into residences and businesses. Given this di-
chotomy, three possible conflicts arise-business firm versus
business firm, business firm versus resident, and resident versus
resident. Conflicts between firms do not suggest any obvious
merit criteria for resolution. Firms ordinarily purchase labor,
land, and raw materials for their activities, and local environ-
mental control seems easily categorized as another factor of
production to be purchased. At any given time, some firms
function with a greater or lesser degree of societal approval, but
such approval or disapproval is normally expressed through the
market in dollar-backed consumer preferences. Some firms (or
20. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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categories of firms) may from time to time be regarded as
especially meritorious (as, for example, ones that produce posi-
tive externalities) ,21 but there is no general principle of inter-
firm merit that would support a suitable criterion for initial
distribution of local control rights.
The resident-versus-firm conflict, however, seems to present
a case for resolution on the basis of a merit criterion in favor of
the resident. If a firm is compelled to purchase local environ-
mental control in order to remain in business, but cannot afford
to do so, the hard capitalist fact would seem to be that consum-
ers of the particular product do not care enough to express a
sufficient preference (through their expenditures) for that prod-
uct as opposed to other available products. On the other hand,
if residents are required to purchase local environmental control
rights and are unable to do so, it is probably because the resi-
dents do not command enough personal wealth to outbid the
nonresidential claimant for the particular local control right.
The result will be residents whose quality of life is curtailed by
whatever power of subjection attaches to the nonresidential re-
cipient of the right-smoke, dust, noise, odor, bright lights, or
whatever. If we are considering criteria for the initial distribu-
tion of these rights, it seems plausible that a value to be served is
the enhancement of the quality of residential existence.
The resident-versus-resident conflict seems more similar to
that between firm and firm. Differences in residential styles
stem from either individual diversity or socioeconomc inequali-
ty. The premise of societal commitment to diversity would seem
to be that no individual style is to be elevated collectively to a
preferred status (subject to the qualification that at some point a
particular resident might deviate so far from the activities con-
templated by the local environmental control assigned to "resi-
dence" as to be impermissibly interfering with that same right in
21. As, for example, where the firm produces localized economic
benefits for its neighbors that are not recouped through sales of its own
products, with the result that the social gain from the enterprise may
well exceed the private gain to the individual firm. Examples cited by
Musgrave are the expensive store that may increase real estate values
in a neighborhood, or the railroad into new territory that may lead to
gains in economic development.
Another sense of positive externality is the good or service that sat-
isfies more generalized or unmonetizable social wants in excess of the
individual wants it would satisfy if distributed through the private mar-
ket. Examples include "merit goods," such as publicly provided school
lunches, free education, or low-cost housing. See R. MUSG vE, THE THE-
ORY or PUBLic FiNA c 7, 13-14, 45 (1959).
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other residents-as the neighbor who practices the tuba all night
out on the roof). Similarly, socioeconomic status seems to
present no basis for concluding that one kind of residential use is
intrinsically superior to another.
In sum, I would suggest that an appropriate merit value to
be served by the distribution of local control rights is the distri-
bution of some agreed-upon minimal level of residential environ-
mental amenity.22  The twin notions that form this value are
that residential amenity ought to be provided as against the
claims of nonresidential land uses, and that such residential
amenity should be provided without favoring residential users
over one another. Before discussing the third distributional
value, I will elaborate on the general argument in support of this
position.
Residential amenity might be regarded as a "merit good"
the provision of which is likely to produce external benefits for
society as a whole-external benefits that would be unrealized
without collective provision to the extent that persons would be
compelled by circumstance to forego the good.23 More specifi-
cally, our societal commitment to equality of opportunity will
not be fulfilled except by conferring a minimum of residential
amenity, since at some point the disagreeable conditions of
one's environment may have suca a destructive impact as to
negate any realistic chance of competing for society's rewards on
an equal basis with others who have not experienced such an
environment. 24 Alternatively, a basic societal obligation to en-
sure a minimal degree of self-respect and dignity to persons
within the society 25 may include a minimum requirement of
control over one's immediate environment. To the extent that
an increasingly crowded environment denies any possibility of
such control without collective intervention to provide it, we may
22. See E.J. IIsHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOmIC GROwTH 70-73(1967); J. UKELES, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MNU CIPAL ZONING 28 (1964);
Heikoff, Economic Analysis and Metropolitan Organization, 39 J. Am.
INST. PLANNERS 402, 406 (1973); Liebhafsky, "The Problem of Social
Cost"-An Alternative Approach, 13 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 615, 667-68
(1973); cf. T. SCITovsKy, Equity, in PAPERS ON WELFARE AND GROWTH 250,
260 (1964). See also L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW
90-93 (1973).
23. See R. MUSGRAvE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FIANC. 13-14 (1959);
P. STEnEam, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE BUDGETLG 15-16 (1969).
24. Cf. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights:
One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 988-89
(1973).
25. See id. at 983-86; Tribe, supra note 18, at 66, 88-89, 96.
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wish to ensure against whatever feelings of helplessness, power-
lessness, or dehumanization may follow from a denial of mini-
mum environmental amenities.
Bound up with all of these arguments is the question
whether there is a collective obligation to provide for any mini-
mum needs of individuals. Without engaging in the general
debate on that issue,26 I will simply suggest that local environ-
mental control is a fit candidate for provision as a minimum
need. The basic spillover problem associated with land uses
necessitates some form of public intervention to distribute local
control rights.27 As suggested above, such a scheme of distribu-
tion must at least describe the rights to be distributed and select
distributional criteria. Since there is a necessary public role in
distributing these rights, some of the usual arguments against
achievement of wealth distribution goals through regulation
seem less applicable in this context. Since we are presently'
considering the relevance of merit criteria to a system for the
initial distribution of these rights, the problem of creating effort
disincentives, with attendant efficiency losses, by forcing persons
to give up accumulated wealth, seems less serious than in a case
of expropriation of vested rights. And the familiar argument
that whatever distributional goals we do wish to achieve should
be realized through direct transfers of income 28 seems less per-
suasive here since such an approach would lead to the initial
creation of a public distributional scheme based on criteria other
than residential preference, and the superimposition of another
public scheme for accomplishing the desired distributional goal,
with attendant political and administrative costs. 29 Why not do
it right the first time?
26. See, e.g., Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and The-
ories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAx. L. Rzv. 877 (1976); Michelman,
supra note 24; Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 H-av. L. Rzv. 7 (1969); Posner, Economic
Justice and the Economist, Tan PuBric INTEEST, Fall 1973, at 109;
Thurow, Toward a Definition of Economic Justice, Tm PuBLIc INTEREST,
Spring 1973, at 56; Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J.
1227, 1267 (1966); Scitovsky, supra note 22; Weisbrod, Income Redistri-
bution Effects and Benefit-Cost Analysis, in PROBLEMS IN PuBac Ex-
PENDITURE AxALYsis 177 (S. Chase ed. 1968); Winter, Poverty, Economic
Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 66-77.
27. See Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights,
1 J. LEGAL STUDES 223 (1972).
28. E.g., Elickson, supra note 18, at 751.
29. See L. Tmm supra note 22, at 58 & n.10 (1973); Weisbrod, supra
note 26, at 183,
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One might argue, of course, that it is unduly paternalistic to
assert that individuals would choose residential amenity despite
the costs thereby incurred in the acquisition of other goods.
Some individuals might prefer to accept a miserable residential
environment if by doing so they could ensure goods at a price
less than that which might result if the producers were forced to
purchase local control rights that they could otherwise have
obtained without cost. One response, however, is that we are
discussing only the initial distribution of these rights, so that
those individuals for whom they are not so valuable may be able
to exchange them for more desirable goods. Individuals would
thus at least have a chance to express their preferences. Even if
exchange possibilities were limited, it seems unlikely that there
would be significant deprivation of choice, since the case sup-
posed is one where some individuals would forego a right to
environmental amenity in order to hold down the price of some
good. Since the price of the good would in all likelihood be
held down for all of its consumers: one must assume that some
subset of those consumers would forego environmental amenity
for the benefit of the whole class of consumers. Since those
forced to make the choice, if it were available, would likely be
those under the severest constraints of budget, the result of its
unavailability would be to deprive some poor people of the
chance to sacrifice environmental amenity in order to reduce the
price of some good available to rich and poor alike. It may
be paternalistic to prevent the sacrifice of environmental
amenity under those circumstances, but it seems that if the
particular good is important enough to the class that would be
put to the choice by force of their initial relative wealth position,
that is the appropriate occasion for government intervention to
subsidize the good, or to make direct transfers of cash. And if
the context is purely local, as where a group of residents would
prefer to sacrifice environmental amenity to a neighboring facto-
ry in order to preserve their jobs, the exchange should be
feasible under any system of distribution (for example, through
a system of waiver by majority or two-thirds vote). Finally, I
am willing to concede paternalism, by which I mean my supposi-
tion that those who would end up worst off under any other
scheme would prefer to be guaranteed a measure of environmen-
tal amenity, especially if told that the next best way to get it, if
they were unable to buy it, would be to strive to achieve through
the political process a relatively massive redistribution of wealth.
Ultimately, all I can do is appeal to what, on the basis of my
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intuition and experience, seems a reasonable candidate for a
shared value, and let the matter rest at that.
3. Prior Appropriation
A critic might suggest that the two preceding sections are
unrealistic to the extent that they assume that the distribution of
local control rights is to be accomplished in a world without
existing land uses. In fact, I have referred a number of times to
the notion that land-use regulation amounts to an initial distri-
bution of rights, as opposed to a redistribution of such rights. It
is time to clarify the concept of "initial" and in so doing come to
terms with one of the most difficult issues in land-use
regulation-the appropriate status to be conferred on the "first
user." One sense of "initial distribution of rights" is certainly
that such rights have never been previously distributed and, by
implication, that all the land involved may be owned, but is not
currently being used in a manner that asserts any spillover
demands. In that narrow sense, a good deal of the relevant
world fails to fit the description, since much of it is already in
use for residences, stores, farms, and factories; any proposed
scheme of land-use regulation ought to take account of that
reality. On the other hand, to the extent that I am trying to
offer an ethical system for distribution of local control rights for
the purpose of testing our methods against that standard and
perhaps suggesting directions or goals for change, nothing seems
inherently wrong with posing an idealized initial position for the
purpose of articulating such a theory.30 An alternative sense of
"initial distribution of rights" is that while there are many
existing land uses, the law governing distribution of them has so
far remained sufficiently ambiguous or elusive as to leave the
question of actual distribution in a state of great uncertainty.31
Against that background, it may be that despite the existence of
a great number of land uses that assert local control rights,
society still needs to develop a method for distributing them
authoritatively, since most of the existing claims are tenuous and
uncertain.
The present section seeks to investigate the extent to which
existing claims may be fairly characterized as tenuous and un-
certain, by focusing on the necessary ethical position of the first
user. Should the mere introduction of a land use in an area
30. Cf. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 17-22, 34-40, 46-53 (1971).
31. See text accompanying notes 82-88, 139-46, 170-78 infra.
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where no competing uses exist, but where the introduced use
imposes a spillover on neighboring land that would produce a
conflict if neighboring inconsistent uses were present, compel the
conclusion that such introduction alone amounts to appropria-
tion of the local control right in question? Some authors have
asserted just such a position for the resolution of land-use con-
flicts. 3 2 The first task, then, is to isolate, in order to scrutinize,
the value of firstness.
Some ostensible firstness claims reveal upon examination
the presence of an additional meritorious basis coupled with the
firstness status. For example, in a particular case, to deny a
local control right to the first user might be inefficient, in the
narrow sense that the objective monetary loss to the first user
might be much 'greater than the objective gain to the preferred
newcomer. If the local control right were awarded to the
newcomer under circumstances where transaction costs might
prevent an exchange that would restore the local control rights
to that first user, the net result would be an efficiency loss. But
in such a case, the 'problem is not sequence of land uses, but
comparative value. If exchange were feasible, it would make no
difference to the efficiency goal that the first user had not been
initially awarded the local control right. Thus, it may be that in
some cases, or categories of cases, we might wish to confer local
control rights on the first user in order to further efficiency
goals; but that is quite different from saying that the first user
has an inherently better claim to the local control right by virtue
of firstness alone. In a case, for example, where a significant
number of latecoming but consistent land uses are opposed to a
single first user, efficiency might dictate favoring the latecomers.
I have already acknowledged that efficiency is an appropriate
goal of land-use regulation. That goal does not by itself resolve
the firstness problem, however. Similarly, the residence value
discussed above might present a basis for conferring local con-
trol rights on residential first users, but the reason for doing so
would be residence rather than firstness.
The question, then, is upon what basis firstness is to be
defended apart from efficiency or residential use. Most defend-
ers support their position by appealing to "expectations." 33 The
32. See Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 165 (1974); Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Con-
flicts, 21 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1969).
33. E.g., Berger, supra note 32, at 174: "A result of no compensation
will seem fair only when the regulated owner could reasonably have
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idea is that there is a significant social cost in disappointing
previously established expectations, and that in a given case such
cost might outweigh the efficiency gains to be derived from
awarding the local control right to the latecomer. 34 I suggest
that there are two senses in which "expectation" must be consid-
ered. The first of these, which, I concede, presents a case for the
first user, is that the local control right has already been distrib-
uted to the landowner who happens to be the first user.35 To the
extent that previous rules of distribution have operated to confer
a local control right upon a particular landowner, who thus may
be fairly characterized as already having a property right legi-
timizing the spillover claim, a subsequent uncompensated redis-
tribution of that right to a latecomer would severely frustrate
expectations. Such a redistribution would be equivalent to the
actual exclusion of a landowner from the land itself and quite
destructive of the basic level of certainty associated with proper-
ty ownership.
A softer sense of "expectations," which might also present
a claim for the first user, is that although previous rules have not
actually distributed the property right to the first user, those
rules did permit or encourage the first user to formulate an
expectation of receiving the local control right if a conflict ever
arose. Here again, I will concede that if the prior rules in fact
supported or gave rise to such expectations, we might hesitate
before upsetting the rights of first users. On the other hand, if
the prior rules were so confusing or uncertain as to prevent the
formulation of such expectations, or if the prior rules explicitly
reminded the first users that their spillover claims were revocable
or at the sufferance of the public decisionmaker, there would be
much less of a case for the first user on the basis of rule-
generated expectations. The actual character of previous rules
of distribution will be investigated later in this Article.
The most difficult question is whether, apart from efficien-
cy, residence, or rule-generated expectations, there is an inherent
ethical status associated with firstness in the context of spillover
claims. Are there any valid expectations of continuity of spillov-
er-demanding land uses where the rules governing such uses do
foreseen at the time he purchased or improved the property that the reg-
ulation would be imposed; in that event, the price he paid would reflect
that expectation."
34. See Michelman, supra note 18, at 1213-25, 1233, 1241.




not create them? If the applicable rules clearly denied protec-
tion to firstness, for example, it would be difficult to assert the
validity of expectations-in the sense used thus far-of continu-
ity. To try to isolate the value, however, let us assume that the
rules are neutral. I suggested earlier that, in the absence of
rules, conflicts over the distribution of local control rights would
likely be settled by assertions of power or by appeals to whatever
persuasive ethical arguments the parties could muster. Would an
appeal to firstness be persuasive under such circumstances? One
value served by firstness is the avoidance of conflict through
appeal to an arbitrary but easily applied rule. That value, how-
ever, seems just as well served by reliance on a relatively predict-
able set of rules, and the argument in its favor is more an
argument for rules of distribution than it is an argument for the
firstness principle.
Another approach is to ask what accounts for the presence
of the first user. In a less crowded, wilder world than ours,
firstness might be a reflection of the adventuresome spirit or
bravery of the particular individual who got there. In such a
context, firstness might be rewarded in order to encourage such
admirable behavior, out of a feeling that those who exploit their
natural endowments through vigorous efforts ought to reap their
just rewards. Or preferring the first users under such circum-
stances might be seen as just another version of the efficiency
principle, encouraging those who add value to the societal prod-
uct. In any event, the modern world fails to fit the description
offered. I suggest that in the modern context first users are just
as likely to have achieved that status through luck, or, perhaps
more likely, through preexisting advantage of power or money.36
Against the background of existing land uses and the in-
tensity of development of our finite land resources, it seems
difficult to conclude that the existing pattern of land uses and
attendant spillover demands amounts to a just distribution of
local control rights. The firstness value, if it is to be recognized,
must ultimately rest on the proposition that those who are there,
who have asserted spillover claims through use, deserve to be
there and therefore deserve to have their spillover demands
assigned to them as property rights. To make such a claim is
equivalent to saying that the existing distribution of land owner-
ship, compounded as it is by such problems as inheritance from
original owners, reflects a just distribution of possessory claims;
36. See R.W. BALDWiN, SocaL Jusn.c 100-01 (1966).
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that those who own land deserve to have it as against those who
do not, or who have less of it. It is one thing to validate existing
land ownership as a vested right for reasons of efficiency and
certainty in property rights (since we are talking about already
distributed rights in that context), but quite another to assume
sufficient desert with respect to those rights to justify a corollary
distribution of spillover demands. If the firstness value means
that it is not simply prior ownership, but the exploitation of prior
ownership through use, that justifies the spillover claim, I sug-
gest again that in the modern context the sequence of exploita-
tion is more likely to be a product of wealth and its attendant
mobility than of the adventuresome spirit of an earlier age. To
the extent that the latter point is accurate, the distribution of
existing but as yet unlegitimized spillover demands may be
largely a function of the existing distribution of wealth general-
ly, which I cannot see as supporting a claim of desert.
On the basis of the preceding discussion, I conclude that
the principal value to be served by land-use regulation (or, more
narrowly, by the system for distributing local environmental
control rights) is the provision of minimum amounts of residen-
tial amenity under conditions that promote economic efficiency.
To promote both of these values, the system should be designed
to the extent possible to prevent conflicts between the efficiency
goal and the residential amenity goal. Where such conflicts do
occur, trade-offs will be necessary,3 7 and those will be discussed
at various points later in the text. Prior appropriation, on the
other hand, confers no special status with respect to local control
rights, except in those cases where a claim based on prior
appropriation is accompanied by an efficiency claim or a claim
based upon rule-generated expectations.
The next part of this section will trace the roles of these
values in designing a scheme for distribution.
B. SELECTING A METHOD OF DIsTRIBuTIoN
1. Defining the Rights
I suggested in Part I that every spillover demand involves
the assertion of a measure of subjection and exclusion over
neighboring land. If I have a house on my land, my spillover
demand amounts to a request that land uses that I perceive as




inconsistent with my residential use be excluded from neighbor-
ing land. Such inconsistent uses might be described by categor-
ies of activities, or in terms of their particular offensive qualities,
such as noises, smells, or ugly sights. The subjection compo-
nent of my demand amounts to an announcement that land users
who perceive my residential use to be inconsistent with their
activities will nevertheless be forced to accept my presence in
their neighborhood. Any scheme for distributing local control
rights must therefore define the activities to be excluded and
those to be permitted each time a right is conferred.
In the context of land-use conflicts, then, to say that one
land user is imposing a "cost" on another is simply a way of
describing an individual's perception that some activity is offen-
sive and adversely affects the victim's enjoyment of his land.38
Such a perception will be reflected in the price that individual,
or one with similar tastes, would pay for land neighboring the
particular offensive activity. The universe of spillover demands
to be distributed as local control rights is the aggregate of these
personal expressions of distaste.3 9 If the goal of land-use regu-
lation were simply one of maximizing these individual prefer-
ences, an ideal system of distribution would define the rights to
be distributed in as many different ways as would be necessary
to reflect the varieties of individual taste. Some might prefer
residential neighborhoods containing all kinds of residential
structures but no commercial or industrial land uses. Others
might wish to permit neighborhood stores but to exclude bars
and shopping centers, while others, might want the bars and
shopping centers but not pool halls, bowling alleys, and porno
theaters. And some will prefer to ]imit the kinds of residential
structures by category, style, or personal characteristics of the
occupants.
For practical reasons alone, the rights must be defined on a
level of generality higher than specific individual preferences.
For initial distributions of rights, at least, problems of drafting
and administration would seem to compel some reduction in the
possible categories to be recognized. And while more accurate
satisfaction of individual preferences at the outset might serve
the efficiency goal, such an approach might subvert the efficien-
38. Cf. Michelman, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 662 (1971).
39. See M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN Lxzm CONVERSION IN THE UNITED
STATES 181 (1971); E.J. MIsHAN, Reflections on Recent Developments in




cy goal in the long run. If efficiency requires exchange transac-
tions, such transactions require units of exchange that are suffi-
ciently fungible to facilitate transfer. As in real property law
generally, there would be a need to control the types of marketa-
ble units to achieve sufficient levels of marketability and certain-
ty. In addition, given a finite surface area available for land
uses, a great deal of "grouping" will be necessary. And once
distributional decisions must be made for "neighborhood" units
rather than for individuals, the decisions are likely to be on a
level of generality that compromises some individual satisfac-
tions by excluding activities that some would prefer to have
available and permitting the introduction of ones that others
would prefer to exclude.
The demands of practicality are not the only ones to be
satisfied in defining the local control rights. Other societal
values, apart from those intrinsic to land-use regulation, may be
implicated by the definitional rules. Many individfals would
probably prefer a system of distribution that permits them to
exclude other individuals on the basis of race, political views, or
other personal characteristics. Even if practical problems could
be overcome and areas set aside for the various minority groups,
our societal commitment to diversity, freedom of expression, and
equality of opportunity would hardly be realized.40  Similar
considerations would lead me to deny the power to establish
land-use exclusions based on architectural or similar aesthetic
criteria.
A much more difficult question is the extent to which the
minimum residential amenity value discussed earlier constrains
the rights-definition process. The specific question is whether
residential users should be able to obtain a local control right to
exclude other kinds of residential users. For the purpose of this
discussion, I will assume that these rights of exclusion are on a
reasonable level of generality, such as single-family homes on
large lots versus single-family homes on smaller lots versus two-
family homes versus townhouses versus apartment buildings. I
will also assume that there is ostensible compliance with the
demands of the residential amenity value insofar as sufficient
land areas are available for each of the designated residential
uses in accordance with current demand for each type, and that
those who want a more restrictive local control right will some-
40. See Elickson, supra note 18, at 735, 749-51; cf. Buchanan v. War-
ley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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how be compelled to pay for it. These assumptions, which I
regard as minimally necessary for the protection of the residen-
tial amenity value, are themselves well beyond the reality of
contemporary land-use regulation. Their achievement would
certainly improve land-use regulation in the direction of the
values I have articulated. Why then, one might ask, do I choose
to jump off the deep end? Because my primary goal of offering
an ethical account of land-use regulation compels me to scruti-
nize every aspect of the problem even if in some realms practical
defeat is likely.
For a number of reasons, I believe that the basic value of
residential amenity is ill served by the segregation of residential
land uses. The criteria for separation seem inherently demean-
ing to those excluded. It is a reasonable assumption that high-
er-density residential users have no particular desire to exclude
lower-density ones. The very scheme of definition operates to
tell succeeding categories of higher-density users that they are
unwelcome in the lower-density setting. Given at least a rough
correspondence between wealth and power and those who are
doing most of the excluding, and since the principal victims will
be those who by force of circumstance are unable to buy in at
the more exclusive level, the message to the excluded is that they
are unfit, or, in the classic phrase of Justice Sutherland, "a pig in
the parlor instead of the barnyard. ' '4 1 If the value of minimal
residential amenity is thought to buttress feelings of self-respect
or dignity, or to promote equality of opportunity, as suggested
earlier, the message of exclusion does precisely the opposite.
Alternatively, it may be said, relying on an apt analogy, that
"separate but equal" cannot ever be equal so long as some
persons are imposing the fact of separation on those who would
prefer not to be separated. The problem is one of imposition by
wealth and power on those without choice; the evil is the implicit
insult.42 And, more specifically, the insult seems directed to the
particular personal characteristics of those excluded that are the
basis for the exclusion.
The current movement to provide separate public facilities
for smokers and nonsmokers 43 might be regarded as presenting
a similar problem, since the nonsmokers are the ones telling the
41. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
42. Cf. Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law,
4 PILosoPHY & PuB. ArFFARS 3, 13 (1974).




smokers to keep out of their areas. But the basis of exclusion is
nothing more than the fact of smoking, which is something
largely within the control of the excluded individual, not based
on economic circumstances beyond the control of the smoker,
and something that the smoker can accept as reasonably offen-
sive to the nonsmokers. That seems quite different from telling
the apartment dweller that the environmental conditions that he
is compelled to accept as a way of life are sufficiently offensive
to justify his isolation from others with power to acquire better
conditions. Finally, I would suggest that, given the realities of
political power, to permit segregation of residential uses would
make it far less possible to achieve the assumptions with which I
began this discussion. The history of zoning in the United
States indicates that it is difficult to prevent separation from
turning into denial of sufficient minimum areas for higher-
density uses.44
A minimum level of generality, then, seems to be required
by the residential amenity value, constraints of practicality, and
other societal values. When these demands have been satisfied,
however, the generalizing process should cease, since the more
general the categories chosen, the more individual preferences
will be unsatisfied and the less successful the whole scheme will
be in achieving the efficiency goal.
2. Distributing the Rights
Once the appropriate levels of generality have been selected
and the rights have been defined, it becomes necessary to choose
a procedure for distribution. The priority rules suggested ear-
lier provide that the rights be distributed so as to guarantee
minimum levels of residential amenity, promote efficiency (sub-
ject to accomplishment of the first goal and without unnecessary
conflict between these two goals), and recognize the rights of
first users where dictated by efficiency or where required be-
cause of prior distributions or existing rule-generated expecta-
tions. Given compliance with these guidelines, the question
arises as to which rights attach to which land.
Two paradigms of distribution technique are case-by-case
adjudication of conflicts and prospective public allocation of
land use. The case-by-case approach, exemplified by nuisance
law, would seek in each case to further the values of land-use
regulation by awarding the local control right to the more de-
44. See text accompanying notes 165-70, 175 infra.
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serving of the conflicting parties. The award would be a right
described with a sufficient level o:f generality to satisfy the re-
quirements of the preceding section. It would also have the
advantage of reasonable specificity, inasmuch as it would, if
adjudicated in normal common-law fashion, be tied to the facts
of the particular conflict.4 5 Even apart from the administrative
expense of the ongoing conflict resolution process, however, the
case-by-case approach might well produce so much uncertainty
with respect to initial locational decisions that costly interactions
would occur simply because both sides were willing to gamble
on the eventual receipt of the local control right at issue.46 The
problem is heightened by the fact that many land-use decisions
are practically irreversible over significant periods of time. Thus
relocation costs and dismantling costs result if one's guess turns
45. The relationship between the two modes of intervention is more
that of points along a continuum than a strict dichotomy. Any scheme
of case-by-case resolution will involve some locational guidance through
announced criteria of decisionmaking. As the scheme moves away from
strict generalized standards, however, the level of certainty decreases.
Cf. Michelman, Book Review, 80 YALE L..L 647, 663-65 (1971).
46. Alternatively, development may be retarded by uncertainty.
See Munby, Development Charges and the Compensation-Betterment
Problem, 64 EcoN. J. 87, 90-92 (1954). There has been some recent de-
bate on the likelihood of conflict-producing locational decisions amidst
the uncertainty of nonregulation. Bernard Siegan has written an entire
book in praise of "nonzoned" Houston, ciing, on the locational issue, such
facts as industrial users seeking land near major transportation facilities,
and car dealers locating along major thoroughfares. See generally B.
SIEGA, LAND USE WimouT ZONING (1972). But there are few instances
of such hard data in his work, and his views are somewhat weakened
by the extensive system of private restrictive covenants in Houston, in
itself a vast scheme of regulation. On restrictive covenants, see note 52
infra. Other observers have commented a good deal less favorably on
the results of Houston's lack of zoning. See R. BABcocK, THE ZONING
GAvm 25 (paperback ed. 1966); J. DELAFONS, LAND-UsE CONTROLS IN TIM
UNITED STATES 81-82 (1962).
Other studies have suggested that zoning classifications of harm may
not accurately reflect individual perceptions of external costs, i.e., that
some activities thought to produce external costs do not in fact do so.
But both studies involved contexts where the number of such presum-
ably noxious activities was regulated by ordinance, suggesting that nu-
merical control may be desirable in lieu of total exclusion for some uses,
as, for example, the grocery store in the residential neighborhood. See
J. UKELEs, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MUNICIPAL ZONING 42-43 (1964) (cit-
ing W. Hunter, Jr., The Effects of Zoning Regulations Upon Real Estate
Values in Contiguous Districts (1957) (unpublished M.B.A. thesis, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania)); Crecine, Davis & Jackson, Urban Property
Markets: Some Empirical Results and T7heir Implications for Municipal
Zoning, 10 J. LAw & EcoN. 79 (1967). But see T.N. Tideman, Three Ap-
proaches to Improving Urban Land Use 40-49 (1969) (unpublished doc-
toral dissertation, University of Chicago) (suggesting that the effects of
inconsistent uses are significant, but highly localized).
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out to be wrong.47 Further uncertainty arises from the very
interdependence of land uses, which makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for individuals to make locational decisions that take
into account the probable behavior of numerous other individu-
als.4 8
Prospective public allocation, exemplified by zoning laws,
employs what has been termed a "separate facilities" solu-
tion to minimize the frequency of costly interactions by directing
individuals to designated areas in advance of locational disputes.
Such a solution is superior to any that can be achieved to resolve
an existing conflict, since by separating the land uses that would
otherwise have conflicted, the approach awards local control
rights without actually interfering with other land uses.49 One
objection to the efficiency of this approach is that its technique
of creating generalized categories of harmful interaction tends to
interfere with and overrule individual preferences that might
differ from the generalized standards.50 I suggested earlier that
for reasons of practicality alone any scheme of distribution must
define the local control rights on a level of generality that is out
of line with some individual preferences. The question is wheth-
er the prospective allocation technique will be likely to deviate
further from such preferences than a case-by-case scheme. If
prospective allocation can be made more responsive and sensi-
tive to individual preferences (or at least to those we are willing
to recognize) than it has been,51 there seems to be no reason to
47. See M. NEuTzE, THE SUBuRBAN APARTMENT BOOm 105 (1968);
Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative
Essay, 9 J. EcoN. LiT. 1, 25 (1971).
48. See Davis & Winston, The Economics of Complex Systems-The
Case of Municipal Zoning, 17 KYxLos 419 (1964); cf. J. ROTHENBERG, Eco-
NoMIc EVALUATION OF URBAN RENEWAL 40 (1967).
49. See J.1L DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRIcEs 72-73 (paperback
ed. 1968); E.J. MISHAN, THE COSTS OF EcONOmIc GROWTH 80-86 (1967);
Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 Am. EcoN. REv.
307, 317-18 (1972).
50. Often, the regulatory scheme will explicitly override individual
preferences, as where such preferences conflict with collective ethical
judgments. See E.J. MnsA, Reflections on Recent Developments in the
Concept of External Effects, in WELFARE EcONOMIcs, supra note 11, at
180, 187; cf. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND Eco-
NoMc ANALYSIS 97-101 (1970).
51. See, e.g., T.N. Tideman, Three Approaches to Improving Urban
Land Use 23-24 (1969) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of Chicago); Bair, Is Zoning a Mistake?, 14 ZONING DIGEST 249 (1962);
Haar & Horack, Emerging Issues in Zoning, in URBAN LAND USE POLICY:
THE CENTRAL CiTY 110 (R. Andrews ed. 1972); Krasnowiecki, Planned
Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of
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suppose that case-by-case resolution, with its drawbacks of ad-
ministrative costs and locational mistakes, is more likely to
achieve efficiency gains.
A more serious objection to prospective allocation is the
danger that those with sufficient power to implement the regula-
tions will, if the process is relatively inexpensive, regulate even
to secure minor gains for themselves that impose great costs upon
others. While this is a serious problem, I suggest that the
difficulty is more one of the values reflected in particular
schemes of prospective allocation than an inherent feature of the
technique, and that realization of the values I have offered as a
basis for public distribution can be accomplished, if at all, only
through some form of prospective allocation.
Once the distributional technique is chosen, there remains
the matter of applying eligibility criteria at the point of initial
distribution. Four kinds of claims will be asserted-prior ap-
propriation claims based on vested rights, prior appropriation
claims based on efficiency, pure efficiency claims, and residen-
tial amenity claims. The first category comprises claims based
on prior appropriation, accompanied by claims of previous distri-
bution of the rights in question or rule-generated expectations
with respect to those rights. In either case, the claimants would
seem to have a good argument for receipt of the right on the
basis of desert alone, and therefore free of charge. A conflict
between members of this category would, by definition, be
impossible, since either one or the other claimant (in a two-party
conflict) would be wrong as to the legitimacy of reliance on the
prior rules, or the prior rules would have been so ambiguous that
no valid rule-generated expectations could have been created. In
the former case of conflict, the winner could be determined; in
the latter, the parties would be dropped from the category,
thereby forcing them to appeal to some other criterion of distri-
bution.
Where a prior appropriation claim is based on efficiency
alone, there seems no reason to prefer one or the other claimant
on the basis of personal desert, since it is the societal value of
efficiency that is being served. i such a case, the goal is to
award the right to the party who would have ended up with it,
regardless of initial distribution, in a world of costless bargain-
Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. Rsv. 47 (1965); Mixon, Diverse-Use




ing. The problem is that the right must be first distributed if it
is to be exchanged, and if impediments to exchange are feared, it
must be distributed to the right party at the outset. But neither
the fact that it must be distributed, nor the goals associated with
that distribution, imply that one or the other party should be
favored with a conferral of wealth. All of this leads me to
conclude that wherever practically possible the right should be
sold to the highest bidder. If neither party deserves the confer-
ral of wealth, it might as well be retained by the public. If
efficiency is best served by exchange transactions, then an ex-
change transaction should be employed to award the right in the
first place. Thus, I would suggest that whenever efficiency is
the only goal to be served by a particular distribution, the local
control rights should be awarded through a price-distribution
system.
One problem of a pricing system is the relative permanence
of price-distributed rights. Where local control rights have been
distributed to purchasers, those purchasers join the category of
prior appropriators to whom the control rights have already been
distributed, and any subsequent redistribution would have to
recognize their preferred status. The more permanent the right
conferred, the more difficult will be future exchange transactions
with respect to those rights if bargaining is not costless, and the
less likely will be the realization of efficiency goals in the long
run.r2 One way of dealing with this problem is to market the
52. Robert Ellickson recommends that greater use be made of the
traditional restrictive covenant as a device for distributing what I
have characterized as local control rights. Ellickson, supra note 18,
at 713-19. Ellickson's own criticisms of covenants are so persuasive,
however, that his overall treatment of the subject leaves me with the
feeling that he is less than enthusiastic, and perhaps ambivalent at best.
See id. If covenants are given greater latitude than zoning laws in terms
of the kinds of "nuisance costs" legislated against, I fear an abdication
of collective responsibility for setting levels of tolerable harm and for
defining the content of locational amenity subject to private appropria-
tion. Under existing law, covenants usually are permitted to go much
further than zoning ordinances. See, e.g., Gaskin v. Harris, 82 N.M. 336,
481 P.2d 698 (1971) (covenant restricting building style of residences to
"Old Santa Fe" or "Pueblo-Spanish" held violated by a swimming-pool
enclosure in oriental style); West Hill Colony, Inc. v. Sauerwein, 138
N.E.2d 403 (Ohio App. 1956) (upholding decision of a homeowners' asso-
ciation under a covenant scheme that all residences must be "Colonial"
or "Western Reserve" style and painted white). Although limitations
on aesthetic zoning have been relaxed in recent years, they still have
a long way to go. See J. DELAFoNs, LAwD-UsE CONTROLS IN THE UNrrED
STATES 77-79 (1962). On the other hand, if covenants are to be regularly
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rights in time units, as with leases of real property, on the
assumption that the pricing system would reflect lesser degrees
of permanence. For undeveloped land, such a procedure would
facilitate response to changing conditions and preferences. For
developed land, the market might reveal that for some kinds of
more practically irreversible locational decisions, longer terms
would have to be offered if no purchasers bid for the shorter
terms. That the problem is not insuperable is suggested by
contemporary markets for leases of real property; lessees do
make substantial investments in improvements despite the rela-
tive uncertainty of less-than-fee ownership.
Another problem of a pricing system is grouping of uses. If
one of a group of neighboring landowners purchases a local
control right, neighbors will be subsequently bound by whatever
level of subjection and exclusion was validated by the particular
right. Those neighbors might prefer to acquire a local control
right inconsistent with the one previously purchased by the
individual. The market mechanism would offer this opportuni-
ty if the group were willing to buy back the right previously
purchased and purchase the desired right from the public. But
the opportunity would never be realized if transactions costs
peculiar to group decisions operated to block the exchange.
Familiar examples of such costs are the freeloaders who cannot
be excluded and holdouts (where there is more than one prior
owner of the right). The likelihood of these impediments to
bargaining suggests the employment of voting schemes for area
purchase decisions. The analogy is to the purchase of public
goods for localized areas through majority-preference consent
scrutinized, we might simply be transferring review of substantive con-
tent from the legislature to the courts.
A more serious problem with covenants is their potential for giving
rise to "prevention costs," in the form of restrictions on mobility of poor
persons, greater than the nuisance costs they are eliminating. Ellickson
recognizes this problem, and answers it with the suggestion that percep-
tions of possible upward mobility will allay the displeasure of the poor
at being forced to bear these' costs, and the further point that covenants
tie up only a small amount of land for a few decades. Ellickson, supra
note 18, at 715. For one thing, the abolition of zoning might well lead
to a rampant increase in the acreage subject to covenants (see, with re-
spect to the Houston experience, note 49 supra and sources cited therein),
and it is less than clear, except where there is a statutory limit, e.g.,
M.nNw. STAT. § 500.20 (1974), that covenants are easily extinguished. See,
e.g., St. Lo Constr. Co. v. Koenigsberger, 174 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Wolff v. Fallon, 44 Cal. 2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955). Earlier in his article
Ellickson discussed the imposition of ccsts on lower-income persons as




schemes, as is often the case where local improvements, such as
streets or sidewalks, are undertaken and financed by special
assessment. Of course, there will be some efficiency losses
through the employment of such procedures, since to the extent
that prices must be determined objectively, or through consen-
sus, accuracy in reflection of individual preferences will be lost.
The market mechanism seems the most appropriate for
handling both prior appropriation claims based on efficiency
alone and pure efficiency claims. That leaves the residential
amenity claims to be distributed. The easy answer in terms of
the values I have suggested is the automatic initial distribution of
an agreed-upon content of residential amenity to all landowners,
without charge. The agreed-upon content should reflect con-
temporary shared values as to the minimum quality of residential
existence, excluding ostensibly residential uses that are actually
inconsistent with residential use (such as the tuba player on the
roof at night), and including ostensibly nonresidential uses that
are regarded as consistent with residential amenity (for example,
neighborhood shops, which might be permitted in residential
districts if landowners are willing to purchase the rights under
the approach suggested above for nonresidential uses). A fur-
ther problem stems from the previously discussed question of
whether residential users should be permitted to segregate them-
selves from one another. Subject to the argument advanced
earlier, I would suggest that those who wish to acquire greater
levels of residential amenity than offered by the minimum
should, if the system is going to offer that option, be required to
pay a premium for the privilege.53 The basic principle again is
that market mechanisms should be employed to distribute local
control rights unless those who claim the rights can be said to
deserve them in accordance with acceptable ethical principles.
3. Protecting and Exchanging Rights5 4
The final objective for a distributional scheme is to develop
methods of protecting previously distributed rights from subse-
53. E.g., Mwn. STAT. §§ 462.12-.17 (1974) (eminent domain zoning
for "restricted residence districts"); see Burger v. St. Paul, 241 Minn. 285,
64 N.W.2d 73 (1954); State ex rel. Twin City Building & Inv. Co. v.
Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1920); Anderson, Zoning in Min-
nesota: Eminent Domain vs. Police Power, 16 NAT'L MuNiciPAL REV. 624
(1927). See also Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969) (com-
pensated zoning).
54. For this subsection I am especially indebted to Calabresi and
Melamed for the analytic framework they developed and applied to pri-
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quent interference and to develop ground rules for subsequent
consensual exchange of those rights. Protection issues arise
when a user otherwise displaced by the exclusion component of
the previously distributed right nevertheless seeks to locate in the
area subject to that exclusion. What remedies will be available
to the holders of the local control rights as against the intruder?
Three choices present themselves--public command, private in-
junction, or private damages.
The public command approach would simply order the
intruder to depart upon a finding that the intrusive activity was
in fact inconsistent with the particular local control right. This
approach would treat the violation as a "public wrong," so that
once the public official in charge decided to press the claim,
holders of the right affected would have no opportunity to waive
the right or settle with the newcomer. The public command
approach would be similar to techniques used to enforce housing
codes, or traditional zoning ordinances, with the actual order to
comply backed by threats of publicly imposed force or fines to
guarantee obedience.
The second remedial possibility would be that represented
by the traditional injunction in nuisance cases. The remedial
process would be initiated by the complaining parties and would
be subject to their control with respect to exchanging the assert-
ed right for some payment from the intruder. The key feature
of this approach, which has been characterized as a "property
rule" for protecting entitlements, is that sale of the right to the
intruder would occur, if at all, only on terms entirely satisfactory
to the sellers.
The third possibility would be the traditional damage ac-
tion, with the rightholders free to seek damages from the intrud-
er for interference with their local control rights. The amount
of the award would be set by a third party applying some
objective formula. This approach has been termed a "liability
rule" and seems the most appropriate one for conflicts not
involving residential land users. The major purpose of distribut-
ing nonresidential local control rights is to facilitate efficiency
goals, the only exception being for those rights already distrib-
uted under a prior system of distribution. Protection for the
latter category might be claimed according to expectations of
protection that accompanied initial distribution of the right.
vate nuisance law in Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 EARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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Since one of the great dangers in any system of distribution
is that the rights will be defined too generally to accommodate
actual individual preferences, the public command approach
seems undesirable. It provides no opportunities-other than
relatively unpredictable ones flowing from prosecutorial discre-
tion-for checking the generalized standards against the actual
preferences of the rightholders. And if the task of blunting the
generality of the rules is left to such discretion, it may well be
accomplished arbitrarily, or for reasons of individual preference
not recognized by the basic distributional system. The injunc-
tive approach seems unnecessary for protection of nonresidential
local control rights. Its principal advantage is that it preserves
for the rightholder the choice of whether to sell and on what
terms and thus permits him to attempt to capture through sale
whatever subjective value his right has over and above an
objective measure of its value. If there are no significant sub-
jective values to be protected, however, there is no need for the
extra protection of such an approach, since it imposes severe
transaction costs in the form of impediments to transfer of the
right. If the goal is efficiency, and the rights involved are easily
monetizable, the damages approach seems most appropriate. The
prices of nonresidential local control rights, which will be
initially distributed through a market mechanism, will certainly
reflect whatever degree of permanence or impermanence, cer-
tainty or uncertainty, that accompanies the rights conferred.
Residential amenity rights, however, demand more protec-
tion than would be offered by the prospect of an action for
damages. The public command approach may not be warrant-
ed, since some check on the efficiency of the residential rights is
desirable, but the availability of injunctive relief seems essential.
The assumption is that there is some significant component of
"subjective value" associated with residence that would remain
uncompensated if the right could be vindicated solely by a
damage action. Suppose a gas station opened up next door to a
residence. There are three ways one could measure the impact
of the gas station, with its attendant noise, traffic, fumes, and the
like, on the residential amenity of its neighbor. First, we could
try to figure out the difference between what a hypothetical
purchaser would pay for the residence before and after the gas
station moved in. This is the market value test. Second, we
might determine what the resident would pay to bribe the gas
station to move away, on the assumption that the amount of the
bribe will reveal the resident's perception of loss from the pres-
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ence of the gas station. Third, we might ask the resident how
much compensation he would demand from the gas station
before permitting it to remain. The difference between the
second approach and either of the other two is that method two
assumes that the local control right was initially conferred upon
the gas station rather than the resident. I inserted it to under-
score one of the reasons for assigning the local control right to
residents in the first place-to minimize the influence of wealth
effects. 55 The value of ensuring minimum residential amenity
for all cannot be achieved if the availability of such amenity
turns on the personal wealth of the resident, and it is that wealth
that limits what an individual could offer under the second test.
Although the first and third approaches seem to be based
on factors other than the personal wealth of the resident, the first
actually compromises individual preferences associated with en-
joyment of residential amenity. The market value computation
is a hypothetical, a construct used in circumstances where value
computations are necessary, and one that concedes the impossi-
bility of measuring precise individual preferences. The first
approach is appropriate, however, in circumstances, such as
eminent domain proceedings, where transactions costs (particu-
larly, the problem of holdouts) might prevent the exchange from
ever taking place. In that sense, efficiency is served. But in the
sense of accurately reflecting individual preferences in the surest
way, through an individual's asking price for a good, efficiency
is ill served by the objective market value approach. Thus there
must be a trade-off between promoting the possibility of ex-
change transactions in the long run and maximizing individual
preferences with respect to residential amenity. The psychologi-
cal and social values of residence that support its special value at
the outset would seem to support protecting it from intrusion in
a manner calculated to insulate those values. Moreover, the
objective market value approach again makes availability of
residential amenity a function of wealth to the extent market
value reduction from a given intrusion may vary directly with
the value of the residence. Thus I would opt for some version
of the third approach to protect residential local control rights.
• 55. See Dolbear, On the Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 Am.
EcoN. REV. 90, 91 (1967); E.J. MisHAN, -E COSTS OF EcoNomc GRowTH
60-62 (1967). Mlishan's ultimate example is the difference between what
a man dying of thirst in a desert would pay for a drink of water and




The efficiency loss generated by the third approach is in the
deterrence of otherwise likely exchange transactions. How
much loss would this be? For one thing, under the proposed
scheme, nonresidential local control rights can be obtained in
advance through the market system, which should operate to
reduce locational uncertainty and promote the grouping of uses
that would be offensive in residential environs. Second, an
exchange transaction is more likely to occur where an incompat-
ible user enters an area that is designated residential but not yet
developed, since the undeveloped land is likely to be held in
larger tracts and important subjective values have not yet been
realized. It is only when the intruder decides to invade a devel-
oped residential area that transactions costs may interfere with
and prevent the exchange. Some compromise might be
achieved along the lines suggested earlier for nonresidential
rights, by permitting exchanges to take place when some per-
centage (probably more than a majority) of affected landowners
is willing to accept an offer from the intruder. While such a
procedure would compromise some subjective values, it would
provide one means of testing the efficiency of the residential
local control right.
The same considerations that apply to protection of resi-
dential control rights would apply to their exchange. Ex-
changes should be made possible only to the point where the
procedure does not impinge significantly on subjective values
associated with residence. The procedure would be similar to
that where a party who has invaded and will be enjoined unless
the plaintiffs can be bought off negotiates to avoid the injunc-
tion. Here, however, negotiations and transfer of rights could
take place prior to the actual invasion. The availability of such
a procedure would probably minimize the number of post-
location conflicts.
In the remainder of this Article, I will attempt to apply the
theoretical structure just offered, with a view to illustrating
some of its more abstract or ambiguous points by imposing it
as a critical tool on a number of traditional topics encompassed
by land-use regulation-nuisance law, the taking-regulation is-
sue, and zoning.
III. PRIVATE NUISANCE LAW
Prior to the twentieth century, private nuisance law was the
principal means of resolving localized spillover conflicts between
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landowners. As early as 1306, a reported case dealt with a
landowner who complained that his neighbor had planted a
grove of trees producing so much shade that the complaining
party's corn could not ripen.56 The major doctrine of nuisance
law, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ("so use your land as
not to injure that of your neighbor"), 57 is little more than a
land-use version of the Golden Rule and, by itself, offers no
guidance as to which of two competing spillover demands is to
be preferred. I will review the development of nuisance doc-
trine in nineteenth and twentieth century American case law
with a view toward suggesting that through its resolution of
conflicts between landowners, nuisance law sought to promote
the values I have offered as intrinsic to a system of distributing
local control rights. That it failed in this task is attributable not
to the values themselves, but to the virtual impossibility of
reconciling the demands of efficiency and residential amenity in
the context of post hoc, case-by-case conflict resolution.
A threshold requirement for judicial intervention in nui-
sance cases is the existence of a "substantial harm"; the claimed
"annoyance must be such as to cause actual physical discomfort
to one of ordinary sensibilities."5 8 'While courts have occasional-
ly intervened to resolve a conflict based on widely held fears, 59
most nuisance cases involve objectively demonstrable conflicts
evidenced by the presence of odors, noises, dust, or smoke. And
despite the presence of serious personal harm, as evidenced by
illness, courts have declined to find a legally significant level of
harm where the particular claim is idiosyncratic to the plaintiff
56. Raising a Covert to the Nuisance, Y.B. 33-35 Edw. I (R.S.) 258
(C.P. 1306), quoted in C. HAAR, LAND-UsE PLAwNiNrN 107 (2d ed. 1971).
57. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF 12HE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 596 &
n.74 (4th ed. 1971).
58. E.g., Kellerhals v. Kallenberge:, 251 Iowa 974, 980, 103 N.W.2d
691, 694 (1960); see W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 87, at 577-80, § 89, at
593, 595 & n.69.
59. E.g., Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, Ill P. 879 (1910) (fear
of infection from proximity of tuberculosis hospital to plaintiffs' resi-
dences). But see McCaw v. Harrison, 259 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1953) (fear
of contamination from proximity of cemetery to plaintiff's farm). The
most frequent instance of judicial willingness to recognize harm based
on attitudes at least akin to fear has been in the funeral home cases.
See, e.g., Powell v. Taylor, 222 Ark. 896, 263 S.W.2d 906 (1954); Gunder-
son v. Anderson, 190 Minn. 245, 251 N.W. 515 (1933). Apart from these
instances, courts in nuisance cases have been reluctant to find harm
based on aesthetic considerations alone. See W. PROSSER, supra note 57,
§ 87, at 577 & n.69.
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and therefore fails to satisfy the objective test of "ordinary sensi-
bilities. '60
This objective test of harm serves the efficiency value dis-
cussed earlier in at least three ways. The threshold harm re-
quirement defines the content of the local control rights awarded
by nuisance law. While the requirement does not by itself
determine which of the parties will receive the local control
right, it does at least enhance the likelihood that in cases where
the offensive activity ends up as the one excluded or limited, the
costs of exclusion or limitation do not exceed the costs reduced
for the complaining party.61 This is especially true in nuisance
cases (as opposed to prospective forms of land-use regulation),
since the conflicting uses are already in place and a decision to
exclude or limit will involve relocation costs or at least practical
or monetary restrictions on a functioning enterprise. And to the
extent that damage awards are insufficient to protect the subjec-
tive values of residence (where the complaining party is a resi-
dent), there is all the more reason to ensure that the offensive
conduct is a sufficiently serious affront to residential amenity to
justify enjoining the defendant. Finally, the practical necessity
of land-use "groupings" seems to compel harm standards based
on a level of generality that will facilitate groupings, with their
inevitable compromises to achieve common denominators of
amenity.
A satisfactory claim of harm, however, is not enough to
resolve the case. Given a conflict, still to be resolved is the
question of which of the competing parties is to receive the local
control right and with what level of protection. Traditional
answers to these questions reveal the irony of nuisance law as a
method of land-use regulation. The ostensible values sought to
be achieved could not be realized without causing efficiency
losses for which the judges refused to assume responsibility. A
number of courts, especially in nineteenth century cases, took
the approach of automatically conferring the local control right
on residential users as against the claims of nonresidential users
who were causing "substantial harm" to the residential commu-
nity. The courts in those cases regarded themselves as guaran-
60. E.g., Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 249, 15 N.E. 768 (1888) (convul-
sions caused by ringing of neighborhood church bell).
61. A higher harm threshold may also serve to keep down the ad-
ministrative costs of managing and resolving nuisance conflicts by reduc-
ing their frequency and ensuring that they are of sufficient severity to
warrant the administrative costs involved.
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tors of residential amenity. A typical judicial expression of that
idea is the familiar doctrine that "the rights of habitation are
superior to the rights of trade, and whenever they conflict, the
rights of trade must yield to the primary or natural right."62
Other courts expressed their concern for residential amenity
through the use of emotionally loaded terms in characterizing
the interest of the complaining resident as the "sanctity of the
home,"63 or the "well-being, comfort, repose, and enjoyment" of
one's home. 4 This special solicitude has also been evoked by
describing the injury facing the defendants from an injunction as
merely economic, "whereas the material interference with the
rights of the plaintiffs is in the day to day use and comfort of the
places where they live."65 Implicft in these expressions is the
recognition of important subjective values associated with resi-
dential amenity-values whose monetary equivalents may be
difficult or impossible to ascertain.66
These dual notions-elemental ethical primacy of residen-
tial amenity and the inherent nonmonetizable or subjective char-
acter of the value of such amenity--may be regarded as signifi-
cant reasons for the traditional reliance on injunctive relief in
nuisance cases.67 The granting of an injunction not only con-
62. E.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225, 229
(8th Cir. 1907); Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn. 374,
379, 173 N.W. 805, 807 (1919); see 1 H. WOOD, NUISANCEs 709 (3d ed.
1893).
63. Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocer Co., 231 Mo. App. 751, 763, 95 S.W.2d
837, 843 (1936). The court went on to include in its opinion two pages
of poetic excerpts in praise of the home. Id. at 763-64, 95 S.W.2d at 843.
64. Jordan v. Luippold, 189 Okla. 189, 191, 114 P.2d 917, 918 (1941).
65. Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 314, 187 N.E.2d 142, 146
(1963).
66. See Barrier v. Troutman, 231 N.C. 47, 50, 55 S.E.2d 923, 925
(1949); Adams v. Snouffer, 88 Ohio App. 79, 82, 87 N.E.2d 484, 486 (1949)
("It is this disturbance of their right of normal living in the community
in which they reside which has been invaded and which is not suscep-
tible of measurement in money damages."); Developments in the Law-
Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1003. (1965); cf. Gavigan v. Atlantic Ref.
Co., 186 Pa. 604, 606, 40 A. 834, 835 (1898) (analogizing to damages for
pain and suffering in personal injury actions).
67. See Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46, 50-51 (1878):
"No man holds the comfort of his home for sale, and no man is willing
to accept in lieu of it an award for damages. If equity could not enjoin
such a nuisance the writ ought to be dispensed with altogether, and the
doctrine of irreparable mischief might be dismissed as meaningless."
See also Adams v. Snouffer, 88 Ohio App. 79, 82, 87 N.E.2d 484, 486
(1949); cf. Shipley v. Ritter, 7 Md. 408, 416 (1855); Czipott v. Fleigh,
87 Nev. 496, 489 P.2d 681 (1971); Wilson v. City of Mineral Point, 39
Wis. 160, 164 (1875).
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fers the right of residential amenity on the successful plaintiff,
but does so by awarding a property right that can be sold only
through the individual's conscious choice, and then only on
terms agreeable to the seller-terms that will presumably reflect
the full subjective value associated with retention of the right.,8
Another key feature of the injunction in protecting residential
amenity is its role as an equalizer. The remedy confers on
residents generally-without regard to wealth or the market
value of the actual loss-a minimum amount of residential
amenity. Judicial recognition of injunctions as devices for guar-
anteeing minimum residential amenity rights to poorer as well as
to richer persons has been most evident in cases where defendant
firms argued that to enjoin their operations would cause losses
exceeding the monetary losses to the plaintiffs:
Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared
with the defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is
not a good reason for refusing an injunction. Neither courts of
equity nor law can be guided by such a rule, for if followed
to its logical conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant of his
little property by giving it to those already rich.69
It seems to us that to withhold relief where irreparable injury
is, and will continue to be, suffered by persons whose financial
interests are small in comparison to those who wrong them is
inconsistent with the spirit of our jurisprudence. It is in effect
saying to the wrongdoer, "If your financial interests are large
enough so that to stop you will cause you great loss, you are
at liberty to invade the rights of your smaller and less fortunate
neighbors."7o
Smoke, noise, or bad odors, even when not injurious to health,
may render a dwelling very uncomfortable, so as to drive from
it any one not compelled by poverty to remain. If the citizen
has no protection against such annoyances, the comfort and
value of his home can be destroyed by any one that may choose
to erect such annoyance near it, and no one, not rich enough
68. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092,
1105, 1116 (1972).
Important subjective values may often be destroyed through eminent
domain takings, where the choice is collective rather than individual, and
the compensation is objectively determined market value. But, given
the impracticality of accomplishing worthwhile public projects other
than by collective, rather than individual, choice, and one's own partici-
pation in that choice through the political process, I do not think that
tolerance of such government intervention undermines the case for pro-
tecting residential amenity against private intrusion through property
rights. Whether nuisance law can accomplish the task without unduly
hindering other societal goals is another question.
69. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 5, 101 N.E. 805,
806 (1913).




to buy all the land around him from which he could be so an-
noyed, could be safe .... I find no authority that will warrant
the position that the part of a town. which is occupied by trades-
men and mechanics for residences and carrying out their trades
and business, and which contains no elegant or costly dwell-
ings, and is not inhabited by the wealthy and luxurious, is a
proper and convenient place for carrying on business which ren-
ders the dwellings there uncomfortable to the owners and their
families by offensive smells, smoke, cinders, or intolerable
noises, even if the inhabitants are themselves artisans, who work
at trades occasioning some degree of noise, smoke, and cinders.
* . * There is no principle in law, or the reasons on which its
rules are founded, which should give protection to the large
comforts and enjoyments with which the wealthy and luxurious
are surrounded, and fail to secure to the artisan and laborer, and
their families, the fewer and more restricted comforts which
they enjoy.71
In a state of society the rights of the individual must to some
extent be sacrificed to the rights of the social body; but this does
not warrant the forcible taking of property from a man of small
means to give it to the wealthy man, on the ground that the
public will be indirectly advantaged by the greater activity of
the capitalist. Public policy, I think, is more concerned in the
protection of individual rights than in the profits to inure to indi-
viduals by the invasion of those rights.
72
Despite the glowing rhetoric of these and other cases, the
courts found themselves too constrained by the efficiency value
to deliver on the promise. The basic problem was the lack of
locational guidance provided by nuisance law's case-by-case ap-
proach. Too many nuisance cases presented a conflict between
the need for protection of subjective values of residential ameni-
ty and unwillingness to reverse expensive locational decisions
where reversal would produce large, measurable economic loss-
es. A few courts granted the injunctions anyway, apparently
willing to tolerate wasteful dislocations.73 Others retained the
71. Ross v. Butler, 19 N.J. Eq. 294, 298, 305-06 (Ct. App. & Err.
1868). For cases explicitly endorsing the egalitarian spirit expressed in
Ross, see Hurlbut v. McKone, 55 Conn. 31, 39-40, 10 A. 164, 167 (1887);
Hennessy v. Carmony, 50 N.J. Eq. 616, 621, 25 A. 374, 380 (Ch. 1892). See
also Krocker v. Westmoreland Planing Mill Co., 274 Pa. 143, 117 A. 669
(1922).
72. McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951, 952
(C.C.D. Utah 1904); see Liebhafsky, "The Problem of Social Cost"-An
Alternative Approach, 13 NATURAL REsOURcEs J. 615, 667-68 (1973). For
additional cases expressing the same spirit, see American Smelting &
Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225, 229-30 (8th Cir. 1907); Woodruff v. North
Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 75S, 807-08 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884); Hols-
man v. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N.J. Eq. 335, 346-47 (Ch. 1862);
Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 543, 57 A. 1065, 1071
(1904).
73. E.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E.
805 (1913); Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568 (1876). See also Pen-
doley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963).
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rhetoric of the "automatic-injunction-to-protect-residential-
amenity" approach, but failed to follow through on the rhetoric
when a difficult choice appeared. In some of the very cases that
contain the most promising language the courts found ways to
avoid following through-by finding that the plaintiffs had
delayed in bringing their action and hence were not entitled to
otherwise available injunctive relief,74 or by finding the defend-
ant's minimal efforts to abate the nuisance sufficient to render it
no longer actionable. 75 Other courts decided that the character
of the area was such that the residential users were the ones who
were mislocated, 76 or preceded a decision for the residents with a
finding that the area in question was in fact residential. 77
The "character of the area" determination amounts to the
explicit imposition of an efficiency constraint on the "residence
always wins" doctrine. The paradigm case for application of
this doctrine to deny relief to a residential claimant is the single
residence in an area occupied by numerous large and expensive
industrial operations. 78 While an injunction would not neces-
sarily close the factories, since the plaintiff might be willing to
negotiate, the opportunities for realizing extortionate sums in
excess of any actual subjective value of the residence are, given
the numerous defendants or potential defendants, many. The
character-of-the-area doctrine may also be seen as judicial recog-
nition of the need to avoid conflicts in the first place by guiding
land users to locate in areas appropriate for their activities. As
such, the doctrine turns nuisance law into "judicial zoning" and,
at the least, warns subsequent land users that they will be
74. See McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951
(C.C.D. Utah 1904).
75. E.g., compare Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn.
374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919) with Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co.,
146 Minn. 406, 178 N.W. 820 (1920); compare Sullivan v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065 (1904) with Sullivan v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 222 Pa. 72, 70 A. 775 (1908). See Stevens v. Rockport
Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914).
76. See, e.g., Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter, 397
S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1965) (airport neighborhood); Robie v. Lillis, 112 N.H.
492, 499, 299 A.2d 155, 160-61 (1972) (not residential enough); Bove v.
Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932) (in-
dustrial area); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627
(1934) (industrial area); Clark v. Wambold, 165 Wis. 70, 160 N.W. 1039
(1917) (agricultural area).
77. See, e.g., Kellerhals v. Kallenberger, 251 Iowa 974, 103 N.W.2d
691 (1960); Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W.2d 1 (1947);
Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocer Co., 231 Mo. App. 751, 95 S.W.2d 837 (1936).
78. E.g., Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258
N.Y.S. 229 (1932).
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appropriately or inappropriately located if they choose to settle
in an area that has previously been the subject of litigation. 79 On
the other hand, the inherent limitations of the doctrine, applied
as it is, after the fact, suggest the advantages of prospective
land-use allocation decisions. In any event, modern nuisance
law has for the most part accepted the character-of-the-area
approach, and the ancient doctrine that "the rights of habitation
are superior to the rights of trade" 80 reappears as "[t]he rights
of habitation in residential districts ordinarily are superior to the
rights of trade or business therein, particularly where the busi-
ness may be defined as nonessential and not dependent upon a
ficed location." '  And still other courts have discovered that
the character-of-the-area limitation is not enough to prevent
inefficient results and have, most typically in actions against
gigantic industrial enterprises, abmndoned any pretense of an
automatic injunction rule, preferring instead to resolve the right
to injunctive relief under a "comparative injury" rule. This
approach measures the economic loss to the defendant against
the objective economic loss to the plaintiffs, limiting the plain-
tiffs to a damage remedy when the balance of losses is against
them.8 2
While American courts have at least tried to promote the
residential amenity value, they have overwhelmingly rejected
prior appropriation as a basis for claiming local spillover rights.
As I suggested earlier, there seems to be no inherent ethical basis
for favoring claims of prior appropriation unaccompanied by
efficiency claims or claims that the rights in question were
previously distributed or that prior distributional rules created
expectations tantamount to those associated with prior distribu-
tion itself. Nuisance cases are consistent with this view. Thus,
79. See generally Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through
Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 440.
80. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
81. Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 113, 29 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1947)
(emphasis added).
82. E.g., Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 F. 789 (9th Cir. 1911); Mc-
Carthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F.
927 (9th Cir. 1908); Koseris v. J.R. Simplot Co., 82 Idaho 263, 352 P.2d
235 (1960); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (overruling Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper
Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913)); Elliott Nursery v. DuQuesne Light
Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345 (1924) (overruling Sullivan v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065 (1904)); Akers v. Mathieson
Alkali Works, 151 Va. 1, 144 S.E. 492 (1928); cf. Dundalk Holding Co.
v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, 137 A.2d 667 ([958). See generally Keeton &
Morri,% Notes on "Balancing Equities," 18 TExAs L. REv. 412 (1940).
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the character-of-the-area doctrine, reflecting efficiency goals,
sometimes confers the spillover right on the first user,8 3 but
often confers it on the newcomer when the prior user has failed
to retain dominance of the area. 4  Stark assertions of claims
based on firstness are usually rejected.8 5
The nuisance law analogue of the previously-distributed-
right type of firstness claim is the now repudiated "coming to the
nuisance" doctrine. This doctrine gave rise to a concept of
previously distributed right only through a misplaced analogy to
prescriptive easement law. Under prescriptive easement doc-
trine, one who regularly and continuously, without license from
the owner, makes affirmative use of neighboring land gains an
easement to continue such use if the unpermitted use is main-
tained for the appropriate limitations period.80 Typical cases
involve rights-of-way, where the hostile use amounts to a regular
vehicular or pedestrian invasion of the neighboring land.8 7 The
kind of hostile use that normally results in a prescriptive ease-
ment is a trespassory one-an interference with the core property
right of territorial exclusion-rather than interference with a
spillover demand of the owner through assertion of an inconsist-
ent demand. On the reasonable assumption that anyone who
owns land should become aware and offended enough by hostile
territorial invasions to perceive such activity as inconsistent with
83. E.g., Rhodes v, A. Moll Grocer Co., 231 Mo. App. 751, 95 S.W.2d
837 (1936) (prior resident, subsequent grocery, residential area); Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970) (prior residents, subsequent factory, residential area, but plain-
tiffs limited to damages remedy); Clark v. Wambold, 165 Wis. 70, 160
N.W. 1039 (1917) (prior farmer, subsequent resident, agricultural area).
84. E.g., Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W.2d 7 (1947)
(prior riding academy, subsequent residences, residential area); Bove v.
Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932) (prior
resident, subsequent factory, industrial area); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum
Corp., 54 RLI. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934) (prior farmer, subsequent oil refin-
ery, industrial area).
85. See, e.g., Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142
(1963); Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W.2d 1 (1947); Camp-
bell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568 (1876); Howard v. Lee, 3 Sandf. 281 (N.Y.
1849); Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 230 (1873). See generally Annot., 167 A.L.R.
1364 (1947); Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 344 (1972).
86. E.g., Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 179, 14 N.W.2d 482, 485
(1944). See generally 2 AvmFcAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.44-.63 (A. Cas-
ner ed. 1952).
87. E.g., Smith v. Pennington, 122 Ky. 355, 91 S.W. 730 (1906);
Rodal v. Crawford, 272 Mich. 99, 261 N.W. 260 (1935); Alstad v. Boyer,
228 Minn. 307, 37 N.W.2d 372 (1949); Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124,
28 S.E.2d 644 (1944); Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. Western Fuel Co., 13
Wash. 2d 75, 123 P.2d 771 (1942).
19761
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the basic fact of ownership, it may make sense to say that an
owner who has permitted a regular and continuing physical
invasion of property will lose the right to exclude an adverse user
after a sufficient period of time. That assumption, however,
seems inapplicable to the case of the mere spillover demand.
Where the continuous spillover demand is asserted against land
not then being used inconsistently, as is true of the coming-to-a-
nuisance case, it is more difficult to conclude that there was
anything hostile to the subjected land in the fact of such use, for
it is only in the context of conflict that actual spillover demands
are asserted. To apply the prescriptive easement rationale is to
say that an owner should have been vigilant, during the statutory
period, on behalf of any or all potential uses of his land that
might be undertaken in the future and would if undertaken be
inconsistent with the existing neighboring use. The more appro-
priate analogy seems to be to those cases rejecting claims of
prescriptive easement where the claims, such as those for ease-
ments of light or air, were essentially negative spillover demands
that indicated no conflict in advmce of the asserted contrary
use.s8
Given its rejection of first-user claims and its unconditional
surrender to the demands of efficf.ency, nuisance law has failed
to produce any concrete expectations with respect to continuity
of spillover demands. The only certainty of the residential
user under nuisance law is that he can rely on enjoying the
local control right of a resident unless his adversary's land use
is now or becomes dominant in the area, and, even if it does
not, his subjective values may be destroyed in a proceeding that
compels him to sell his right to hds adversary for its objective
market value. For nonresidential users who have not acquired
spillover rights by purchase, the level of certainty is as low or
lower than that attached to residence. If the values of nuisance
law are to be better achieved, the force of the efficiency con-
straint must be blunted by minimizing the locational uncertainty
that makes so many nuisance problems intractable. In Part V, I
will examine zoning, which is a technique for reducing location-
al uncertainty, but one which produces difficulties of its own in
terms of the basic distributional values. Before doing that,
88. E.g., Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939); Krulikow-
ski v. Tide Water Oil Sales Corp., 251 Mlich. 684, 232 N.W. 223 (1930);
Parker & Edgerton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 09 (N.Y. 1838); Snyder v. Plank-
enhorn, 398 Pa. 540, 159 A.2d 209 (1960); Depner v. United States Nat'l
Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851 (1930).
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however, I will examine the "taking-regulation" issue insofar as
it relates to localized spillover conflicts, since it is in that doc-
trine that zoning law is inextricably linked to its nuisance heri-
tage, and because it is that doctrine that serves to limit the power
of government to deny spillover claims to landowners who assert
them.
IV. THE "TAKING" ISSUE
In Part II, I offered a framework of values to be furthered
by a system for distributing local environmental control rights to
landowners. In Part III, I attempted to show that the particular
mix of values offered in Part II was hardly novel and, in fact,
seemed implicit in at least the rhetoric of traditional nuisance
doctrine. In the present section, I will examine those values in
the context of the constitutional law of private property. It is
not my intent to persuade anyone that my conception of the
values associated with land-use regulation is or ought to be
enshrined in federal constitutional law. It may be that for
institutional reasons the merits of these decisions will be relegat-
ed to government agencies other than the courts89 or at least to
state rather than federal courts.0 0  My specific goal for the
present section is to check the consistency of my views with some
of the leading constitutional cases, and with some of the prior
doctrinal analyses. I will also attempt to apply to some of the
recurring problems in this area my conception of the legitimate
expectations of private landowners.
The United States Constitution, through the fifth amend-
ment,91 prohibits the taking of private property for public use
except upon payment of just compensation. The recurring
89. With respect to federal law, the tradition of deference to legisla-
tive judgment in the area of land-use regulation was strongly reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1(1974). Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (strict standing require-
ments for challenges to local zoning ordinances). See also James v. Val-
tierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
90. State courts continue to show a greater willingness to engage
in substantive review of local land-use regulations. Compare Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974) with, e.g., Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970), or Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423
U.S. 808 (1975). See generally Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum
Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CA iJ. L. REv. 1384, 1429-50(1971).
91. U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation,"
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question is whether government action has so interfered with the
claims or expectations of private landowners as to be deemed a
"taking" within the meaning of the clause. Since the subject of
this Article is spillover demands with respect to use of land, I
should distinguish at the outset between those taking cases that
involve spillover demands and those that do not. As suggested
earlier, every spillover demand involves a measure of subjection
and exclusion asserted over neighboring property. At some
point, however, the particular measure of subjection or exclusion
asserted transcends the domain of spillover demands and be-
comes tantamount to an assertion of territorial ownership of the
neighboring property. Thus one whose peace and quiet requires
the total absence of any human activity or presence within a
radius of two miles asserts an exclusion claim amounting to
territorial control over neighboring land. Similarly, one whose
subjection claim is some use that is uniquely obnoxious to all
other land users, and hence incompatible with any neighboring
activity, also effectively asserts territorial control. These cases,
along with those where an actual physical occupation by the
public or by other private individuals is legitimized by govern-
ment action, as where a landowner is informed that his land has
been declared a public park, belong in the "physical invasion"
category of taking cases.
I join other writers9 2 in regarding those cases as involving
government interference with a core concept of property owner-
ship. I argued earlier that mere ownership of land does not
legitimize any particular spillover demands with respect to that
land, since the spillover demands of one landowner must meet
and conflict with those of others. Claims that do not involve
spillovers at all, however, do seem implied by the mere fact of
ownership, and it is those claims with their associated expecta-
92. See Michelman, supra note 18, at 1226-29; Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALn L.J. 149, 162-65 (1971). Michelman
suggests that psychological values of property ownership are threatened
by "the stark spectacle of an alien, uninvited presence in one's territory."
Michelman, supra note 18, at 1228 (footnote omitted). Thus I suggest
that at the point of physical invasion a denial of compensation becomes
such a denial of the basic expectations of private land ownership that
it is tantamount to a denial of private ownership altogether. A similar
emphasis on the core values associated with private ownership may be
seen in those physical invasion cases where the analysis relies much
more on the "private" than the "ownership" component of private owner-
ship, that is, where the issue is explicitly regarded as one of personal
liberty. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 V.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tions that are protected from physical invasions. While, as with
all legal distinctions, cases will arise that cannot easily be as-
signed to either category,93 I do think that there are minimal
notions of territorial exclusion and personal occupation of land
that are basic to the concept of private ownership, and that those
minimal notions are reflected in the "physical invasion" taking
cases.9 4 The remainder of this section will deal only with those
taking cases that may be properly characterized as involving
spillover demands.
Landowners often assert that a taking has occurred when
government activity deprives them of some spillover demand
with respect to their land. The government may intervene to
terminate spillover demands asserted through current use, as
when a landowner is directed to close a brickyard that is incon-
sistent with neighboring residential uses, 5 or told to stop mak-
ing alcoholic beverages because of their impact on the public at
large,90 or deprived of trees that are inflicting a plague on the
trees of other landowners.9 7 The government activity may also
take the form of a prospective denial of spillover demands that
landowners might have asserted but for the regulation, as when
landowners are directed not to build stores or factories in desig-
nated areas where such land uses would be inconsistent with
anticipated residential uses,98 or told to refrain from mining that
would be inconsistent with the enjoyment of surface land
users,9  or prevented from constructing buildings beyond a
height designated for the landowner's district so as not to impose
93. See Michelman, supra note 18, at 1184-90 (especially his dis-
cussion of the airport cases).
94. Another distinction between the physical invasion cases and the
spillover cases is illustrated by the kinds of justifications used by courts
to uphold what would otherwise be physical invasions. Such physical
invasions, when validated, are usually upheld on the basis that they were
consensual, in that the landowner voluntarily gave up a claim, or waived
it, or abandoned it, or on the basis that they were already or at least
simultaneously compensated through receipt of a benefit. Thus, instead
of justifying the landowner's loss in terms of some larger public purpose,
it is justified by denying that anything has in fact been "taken" or by
showing that the "taking" has been cancelled out by something re-
ceived. For some examples of this kind of reasoning, see the cases col-
lected in G. LEFcoE, AN INTRODUCTION TO AmERIcAN LAND LAW 138-61,
190-95 (1974). Similar reasoning supports subdivision "exaction." See
authorities cited in note 188 infra.
95. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
96. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
97. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
98. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
99. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v, Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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a danger on the community at large,10 or prohibited from sell-
ing the land to persons of a particular race so as to prevent an
imposition on the majority race within a district.10 1 Finally,
government may proceed to deny a spillover demand by physical
occupation rather than regulation, as where government as land-
owner moves in next door to you and operates an airport'0 2 or
sewage treatment plant.10 3
Since every denial of a spillover demand involves a recipro-
cal conferral of the local control right elsewhere, it is important
to note that these government denials also amount to conferrals
on others. In some cases the beneficiaries will be other private
landowners;'0 4 in others the single beneficiary will be the public
at large;' 0 5 and in others there will be a mix of private and
public beneficiaries. 0 6 I will develop the point further be-
100. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
101. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
102. E.g., Batten v. United States, 3W6 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963); Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v.
Porter, 397 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1965). For cases where a complaining land-
owner has been held entitled to compensation if he shows sufficient de-
crease in the value of his property, see, e.g., Alevizos v. Metropolitan
Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 216 N.W.2d 651 (1974); Thornburg v.
Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). For a recent survey
of the cases, see Russell, AircraftlAirport Noise: Current Legal Remedies
and Future Alternatives, 42 INs. CouNsEr. J. 92 (1975).
103. See, e.g., Hartzler v. Town of Kolona, 218 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa
1974); Adams v. Arkansas City, 188 Kan. 391, 362 P.2d 829 (1961); Glace
v. Town of Pilot Mountain, 265 N.C. 181, 143 S.E.2d 78 (1965); East St.
Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Ore. 505, 246 P.2d 554 (1952);
City of Abilene v. Downs, 367 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1963).
For other examples of spillover conflicts produced by physical prox-
imity of a government facility, see, e.g., Brennan v. Town of West Haven,
151 Conn. 689, 202 A.2d 134 (1964) (discharge of water from a drainage
pipe); Rodgers v. Kansas City, 327 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. 1959) (setting of
experimental fires on public property); Pharr v. Garibaldi, 252 N.C. 803,
115 S.E.2d 18 (1960) (minimum security prison); City of McAlester v.
King, 317 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1957) (erection of water tower).
104. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915).
105. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See the discus-
sion of the "common resource" cases at text accompanying notes 154-
60 infra. The "airport nuisance" cases also fall in this category, along
with the other government facility case.s. See authorities cited in notes
101 and 102 supra, and text accompanying notes 147-53 infra.
106. See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 159 and 160 infra). In one sense, the public should
be the beneficiary whenever government takes action with respect to a
spillover claim, since if the government action promotes efficiency, it
.hQuld increase the total value of the social product, In the sense of pri-
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low,' 0 7 but I do suggest for the moment that the question
whether a particular denial amounts to a taking may depend
upon the size and identity of the beneficiary class-that the issue
of "takings" may also be one of "givings."
Judicial responses to claims of taking in cases of spillover
denial may be roughly divided into two categories.1 08 In one
category of cases, the spillover demand is denied regardless of
the value impact on the asserting landowner's property. For
example, in Mugler v. Kansas0 9 the owner and operator of a
brewery challenged a state constitutional provision that banned
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages. State law
declared the places and equipment for the manufacture of such
beverages to be public nuisances. The owner claimed that he
had entered the brewery business when it was legal to do so, that
he had invested $10,000 in the brewery, and that the effect of
the state's action was to deprive him of nearly all the value in his
property by rendering it worthless yet failing to compensate him.
The Supreme Court rejected the brewer's claim, basically saying
that the state could decide that alcoholic beverages were a kind
of public nuisance, offensive to health and morals, and that by
analogy to traditional nuisance law, it was within the power of
the state to outlaw the offensive activity. Although that case
involved a pervasive rather than a localized harm, it did establish
the principle that when a state merely wishes to terminate a
nuisance, it need not compensate the offending landowner. Had-
acheck v. Sebastian"° did involve a localized spillover demand.
vate benefit that I am suggesting, however, such action, even if efficient,
might nevertheless be regarded as having private beneficiaries to the ex-
tent that private individuals are treated as the conduits for public effi-
ciency gains, especially where such gains are realized in the form of dis-
cernible land value increases. In my view, then, the only true public
benefit situations are those where the gain is realized for a publicly held
resource or facility, and the criterion, efficiency, that justifies the public
action, will not be sufficient to justify resultant private benefit. Some
other principle of desert must explain the good fortune of the recipients
in order to satisfy disappointed losers.
107. See text accompanying notes 138-39, 152, and 158-60 infra.
108. This discussion is limited to cases where the government action
is assumed to be a valid one, for a legitimate public purpose, and the
only question is whether compensation is required or not. There is of
course a third category of government actions denying land-use spillover
claims where, because of conflicts with values other than property own-
ership expectations, the action is held invalid, regardless of willingness
to compensate. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (racial
discrimination).
109. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
110. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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The challenged ordinance in that case required the immediate
termination of the operation of a brickyard that had preceded
other development in its area but was now in a residential
neighborhood. The economic impact on the brickyard owner
was a reduction in the value of the bed of clay surrounding the
brickyard from $800,000 to $60,000. The Supreme Court, relying
on the nuisance analogy, upheld the regulation.
In a second category of cases, the validity of the govern-
ment intervention seems to depend upon whether the landowner
is left, after rejection of the particular spillover demand, with
some reasonable value in the land. Under this view, particular
denials are valid or invalid depending on how catastrophic their
market value impact may be. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon"' is often regarded as such a case. Pennsylvania had
enacted a statute prohibiting mining wherever such mining
would cause the subsidence of a structure used as a human
habitation. The problem that had led to the statute was that
many homeowners in Pennsylvania owned only surface rights in
the land upon which their homes were built. These rights had
been purchased from coal companies by deeds such as one
described in the opinion, which "conveys the surface, but in
express terms reserves the right to remove all the coal under the
same, and the grantee takes the premises with the risk, and
waives all claim for damages that may arise from mining out the
coal."112 The statute also prohibited such mining under public
property, inasmuch as the public had also acquired only surface
rights in a number of instances. The coal companies com-
plained that the statute effectively destroyed their property rights
in the minerals underneath the surface and that such destruction
of rights could not be accomplished without payment of just
compensation. The Supreme Court agreed, ostensibly on the
theory that some government regulations limiting property rights
simply go too far; the statute at issue had destroyed all value in
the minerals by making mining impossible.
Many commentators and subsequent cases have derived
from Pennsylvania Coal the principle that land-use regulations
must stop short of depriving a landowner of all reasonable value
in the land.113 The principle seems to explain the difference
111. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
112. Id. at 412.
113. See, e.g., Maher v. New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653, 662 (E.D. La.
1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1051, 1066 & n.83 (5th Cir. 1975); Phoenix v.
Oglesby, 112 Ariz. 64, 66, 535 P.2d 934, 936 (1975); Ford Leasing Dev.
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between two of the Supreme Court's early zoning decisions,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.114 and Nectow v. City of
Cambridge."'5 In Euclid, the Court upheld a comprehensive
zoning ordinance against a landowner's claim that the portion of
its land classified as residential had been depreciated by the
ordinance from $10,000 per acre to $2500 per acre. In
Nectow, the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance to the extent
that it applied a residential designation to land worthless for
such use. More recently, in Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead," 6 the Court refused to strike down an ordinance
that prohibited mining of a gravel pit below the water table. The
Court held that the complaining landowner had failed to show
that the ordinance was unreasonable because, among other
things, the landowner had not shown "[i] n terms of dollars or
some other objective standard . . .how much, if anything, the
imposition of the ordinance would cost. 1" 7
What accounts for the difference between the two categor-
ies of cases? How does one determine whether a case falls into
one or the other? And is there any general theory of fairness
that offers guidance as to when denials of spillover demands
should give rise to compensation claims and when they should
not? Of the many commentators who have dealt with this
issue, 1 8 two have offered what seem to be the most persuasive
and thoughtful analyses of these issues. Joseph Sax, rejecting
the neat dichotomy he had offered to explain the same problem
Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 Colo. 418, 426-27, 528 P.2d 237, 241(1974); Trachsel v. City of Tamarac, 311 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. Ct. App.
1975); City of Evansville v. Reis Tire Sales, Inc., 333 N.E.2d 800, 802 (Ct.
App. Ind. 1975); Palmer v. Township of Superior, 60 Mich. App. 664, 676,
233 N.W.2d 14, 19-20 (1975); Wackerman v. Town of Penfield, 47 App.
Div. 2d 988, 366 N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (1975); D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING
AND LAND DEvLPMEWNT CONTROL LAw 325 (1971); Michelman, supra
note 18, at 1190-93.
114. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
115. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
116. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
117. Id. at 595.
118. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING
IssuE (1973); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 165 (1974); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Per-
spective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup.
CT. REV. 63; Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid
Taking, 57 MIN. L. REv. 1 (1972); Michelman, supra note 18; Sax, Tak-
ings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Van Alstyne, Tak-
ing or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation
Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
19761
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
in an earlier article, 119 recently presented a new synthesis in his
Takings, Private Property and PubZic Rights. 20 He begins with
a distinction between land uses that involve spillover demands
on other land and those that do not. His basic contention is that
where government activity limits ]and use over and above any
spillover demand made by the landowner, compensation will be
required, but that where government is merely denying a spillov-
er claim, compensation will generally not be required. Where
competing landowners seek to use their land in a manner that
involves some imposition on neighboring land, according to Sax,
neither one is a priori entitled to prevail, and therefore govern-
ment may curtail the use of one or the other without triggering
the taking clause. 121
He offers two exceptions to this general principle of non-
compensation. Compensation will still be required in cases of
"governmental discrimination," which Sax regards as the "equal
protection dimension of compensation law.' 1 22  A claim of
discrimination arises when government, in seeking to accommo-
date conflicting interests, chooses to impose a burden on some,
but not all, of a class of similarly situated parties. The only
example he offers is that of a government decision to impose
open-space obligations by requiring a one-quarter acre vest
pocket park on every 10 acres of center-city land. If there is no
observable reason to impose the requirement on one owner
rather than another, compensatior, of those selected will be
required.12 3 Sax would not require compensation, on the other
hand, if the regulation applied to some general class of land
users, such as all strip miners. The other limitation on legisla-
tive regulation that Sax offers is he "risk of excessive zeal,"
suggesting that "the judiciary may inutervene at the extremes to
hold a resolution of competing claims to be so misguided as to
be beyond the bounds of the police power.' 24 He later ampli-
fies the point by characterizing such cases as those "in which the
court is satisfied that the legislative determination is sufficiently
distorted as to constitute an abuse of the police power; that the
legislature has subordinated a judgment about maximization of
social benefits to advancement of private gain."'125 Thus Sax,
119. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
120. 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
121. Id. at 161.
122. Id. at 169.
123. Id. at 169-70.
124. Id. at 171.
125. Id. at 176 (footnote omitted).
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beginning with the proposition that land ownership alone fails to
imply any expectation with respect to spillover demands, con-
cludes that, subject only to his two "exceptions," there is no
ethical theory governing their distribution. The balancing of
social gains and losses in particular cases, he argues, is a job for
the legislature in its pursuit of efficiency.
Frank Michelman, in his Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law,126 links the question of when compensation is required to
general ethical principles with respect to property rights and
associated expectations. From the perspective of utilitarian
property theory, he suggests that compensation is required when-
ever the particular government activity imposes excessive "de-
moralization costs" on affected landowners or their sympathiz-
ers. 127 From the alternative perspective of John Rawls's "justice
as fairness" theory, Michelman suggests that the key variable is
whether a disappointed landowner is able "to appreciate how
such [government] decisions might fit into a consistent practice
which holds forth a lesser long-run risk to people like him than
would any consistent practice .. . suggested by the opposite
decision."'128 Michelman's analysis suggests two criteria as most
significant for determining entitlement to compensation---dis-
crimination and defeat of expectations. The discrimination
theme is apparent where he suggests that
the "evil" supposedly combatted by the constitutional just com-
pensation provisions [is the] capacity of some collective ac-
tions to imply that someone may be subjected to immediately
disadvantageous or painful treatment for no other apparent rea-
son, and in accordance with no other apparent principle, than
that someone else's claim to satisfaction has been ranked as in-
trinsically superior to his own.' 29
The "defeat of expectations" notion is made explicit by Michel-
man's suggested judicial rule that compensation, in other than
physical invasion cases, is due only when there has been "a
nearly total destruction of some previously crystallized value
which did not originate under clearly speculative or hazardous
conditions." 3°
For Sax, the simple answer to Michelman's concern with
expectations is to distinguish between land uses that involve
126. 80 HAR. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
127. Id. at 1214-16.
128. Id. at 1221-23.
129. Id. at 1224-25.
130. Id. at 1250.
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spllover demands and those that do not. Sax seems to be
saying that since there are no a priori grounds for favoring one
or the other party to a spillover conflict, no legitimate expecta-
tions are defeated by denial of such claims. His willingness to
concede a discrimination constraint, however, brings him much
closer to Michelman's analysis, since he does seem to recognize a
generalized expectation of consistent treatment. In the remain-
der of this section, I shall attempt to relate these ideas of
expectation and discrimination to the conceptual scheme I of-
fered in Part H, in the context of recurring categories of contro-
versies out of which the "taking" issuae has arisen.
Before exploring the judicial responses in taking cases, I
must subdivide the conflicts themselves into two categories.
13 1
The first category is that which served as a model for my
analysis in Part 1-the localized dispute. In the purely local-
ized dispute, epitomized by the traditional private nuisance case,
the award of the local control right to one or the other party
results in an imposition only on the losing party and not on the
public at large. While there may be public interest in the
outcome, reflected in the values of residential amenity, efficien-
cy, and prior appropriation, the spil]over demand itself is assert-
ed against only the opposing party. Many taking cases, how-
ever, involve an additional element-assertion of a spillover
demand not only against a competing landowner, but also
against a public resource. For example, in a conflict between a
relatively clean factory and a resident, a decision for either side
will have no physical impact on any resource other than that of
the other party. Whatever public values are to be served by the
decision are adequately represented through the claims asserted
by the contestants. In a conflict between a particularly smoky
factory and a resident, however, a decision for the factory may
involve imposition not only on the aggrieved resident, but also
on the general level of air quality, a public resource. '3 2 In such
131. One of the difficulties that I have with the analysis in Sax's
later article, supra note 120, is that he seems to treat all cases of spill-
over demands as within what I call the "common resource" category.
I find more difficult ethical questions raised by my "localized spillover"
category, where the only occasion for intervention is to choose one or
another private claimant.
132. The distinction between "localized spillover" cases and "com-
mon resource" cases is illustrated by a comparison of the majority and
dissenting opinions in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257
N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), where the majority seemed to regard
the case as the former, while the dissent treated it as the latter.
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a case, there is more at stake than simply which of two compet-
ing landowners will be awarded a local control right; there is an
additional question of the maximum level of spillover to be
tolerated with respect to the public resource involved. Since
such cases frequently involve limits on the use of previously
"free," or, at least, "unpriced" goods, such as air, water, or
public highways, setting maximum levels of imposition involves
a direct interference with the result that would have been
achieved through a normal test of market efficiency. While
market tests may be used in some circumstances to distribute to
individuals their public resource spillover rights,133 the ultimate
level to be set will reflect our societal notion of the worth of the
particular resource, which may be unquantifiable. 34 In such
cases, I will later suggest, the discrimination aspect of restric-
tions on takings becomes most significant. I will discuss first,
however, the application of the taking rules to localized con-
flicts.
The cases of true localized conflicts seem most analogous to
traditional private nuisance cases. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian'3
the Court simply upheld a city's decision to accomplish by
ordinance what a court could have accomplished by judicial
decision under nuisance principles. A brickyard in a residential
area certainly met the threshold test of substantial interference.
The brickyard operator had no previously distributed spillover
right over the neighboring land, and the decision to close the
brickyard reflected a public affirmance of the residential ameni-
ty value. The only value possibly ill served by the Supreme
,Court's approval of the local legislative decision was that of
efficiency, since a court in a traditional nuisance case might have
been unwilling to conclude that the subjective values of the
residents wete sufficient to overcome the objective economic loss
to the brickyard. As I suggested earlier, the efficiency criterion
is at best difficult to apply to such cases, and while it might have
been better (in terms of efficiency) had the residents and the
brickyard been directed to different neighborhoods at the outset,
they were not. Thus, in a localized conflict between residential
and nonresidential claimants, taking doctrine should not prevent
the award of local control rights to the residential claimants
133. See, e.g., J.1L DALEs, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRIcES 77-100 (pa-
perback ed. 1968).
134. See Freeman, Book Review, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 870 (1976), where
I offered some comments on this issue in the context of forest policy.
135. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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where there is reasonable certainty as, to the existence of a
genuine conflict and where no legitimate prior appropriation
rights are being taken away.
Where the parties to a localized conflict are both nonresi-
dential users, I have suggested that, subject only to situations
involving prior appropriation rights, there is no principle other
than efficiency to be served by t;he resolution of the conflict.
Miller v. Schoene136 seems to be such a case, inasmuch as it
involved a conflict between agricultural land users.137 The
conflict seems to have been genuine-cedar trees infected with
cedar rust passed the disease by spores to apple trees within a
radius of two miles, causing destruction of both fruit and foliage
of the apple trees. The Supreme Court recognized that "the
state was under the necessity of making a choice between the
preservation of one class of property and that of the other
wherever both existed in dangerous proximity.' ' 83 Given the
relative aggregate values of apple trees and ornamental cedar
trees, the state seems to have made the right choice on efficiency
grounds-if the matter had been put to a market choice, the
apple tree owners would have likely outbid the cedar tree owners
for the spillover right in question. Nothing, in the sense of
defeated legitimate expectations, seems to have been "taken"
from the cedar tree owners. In terms of the values I have
suggested, and their mode of realization, the case raises a serious
question not because the state took anything from the losers, but
because the state chose to "give" the right to the winners without
charge. To say that one or the other party must win does not
imply that the winner deserves to receive the right for free, as in
the residential amenity cases, or even that efficiency values will
be well served in the long run by substitution of legislative
judgment for market judgment. Miller thus regarded is a classic
case not of taking, but of questionable giving. The evil in such
cases is that associated with the discrimination problem-resent-
ment on the part of the cedar tree owners at the state's decision
to make a gift to an already large and powerful industry. The
decision on the merits in Miller :makes sense in terms of the
values I have offered only if the apple industry as claimant can
be regarded as sufficiently deserving of a public subsidy.
136. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
137. See Sax, supra note 120, at 165. Nothing in the opinion seems
inconsistent with this characterization.
138. 276 U.S. at 279.
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In neither Hadacheck nor Miller did the Court seem parti-
cularly concerned with the degree of economic impact on the
losing claimant. In some taking cases, the question of degree of
harm (or the complementary question of economic value re-
maining for the disappointed claimant) seems more significant.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,19 often regarded as the
source of this doctrine, was a localized spillover case'140 in which
the Court struck down the state statute, holding for the party
denied the spillover right. The difference between Pennsylvania
Coal and the other two cases is that those relying on the spillover
rights awarded by statute in Pennsylvania Coal would not have
had even an arguable common-law nuisance claim against the
coal companies. It is the rare kind of private nuisance conflict
where the rights sought by the claimants are ones previously
distributed to their adversaries. While many surface owners
were involved in the conflict, the case amounted to no more than
an aggregate of individual surface claims asserted by owners
who, at the time of purchase (by themselves or their predeces-
sors in title), had specifically awarded the spillover right in
question to the subsurface owners. Thus, Justice Holmes char-
acterized the statute as "purport[ing] to abolish what is recog-
nized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable
estate-and what is declared by the Court below to be a contract
hitherto binding the plaintiffs.' 14 1 Similarly, he concluded: "So
far as private persons or communities have seen fit to take the
risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact
that their risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them
greater rights than they bought."'142
139. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
140. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at
416-22, offers a clever brief in support of a common resource charac-
terization of the case. His analogy to Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91(1909), seems flawed because Welch did involve protection of the inter-
ests of third parties whose rights had not been previously distributed(the neighboring landowners exposed to the risk of fire), while the very
risks being reallocated by the statute in Pennsylvania Coal are those be-
tween surface and mineral owners. Brandeis's argument based on the
fact of public ownership of some of the surface interests protected by
the statute, 260 U.S. at 421-22, again fails to answer the point of previous
distribution, since his argument seems to be that the public as landowner
acquires a greater title than a private party would acquire to the same
land and simply because the public has purchased it. See text accom-
panying notes 150-51 inlra.
141. 260 U.S. at 414.
142. Id. at 416.
1976]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
It may be that even previously distributed rights must yield
in cases where there is a question as to the legitimacy of their
initial acquisition, or where their consequences were unanticipat-
ed at the time of their creation, or where they impinge on a
public resource apart from the claims of the parties to the
conflict. But Pennsylvania Coal was not such a case. The
decision seems to have been no more than a recognition of
private ownership of land, with its associated notions of security
of ownership rights, offering little guidance for the vast majority
of cases where spillover rights have not been authoritatively
distributed.
Thus, while Justice Holmes wrote about the degree of
imposition on the coal companies, that principle does not seem
to explain the case when it is compared with Hadacheck and
Miller. When, if ever, is it relevant to inquire into the value
remaining to a claimant whose spillover demand has been de-
nied? The inquiry has been undertaken most frequently in
zoning cases,143 especially where zoning classifications separate
land uses that might never have opposed one another in a
traditional nuisance case. In an attempt to anticipate land-use
conflicts and prevent them by directing users to respective sepa-
rate locations, zoning must be effectuated before the conflict
arises. In lieu of the litigated fact of substantial conflict
presented in nuisance cases, zoning offers only a legislative
categorization of land uses supposed to conflict with one anoth-
er. The further the legislative classifications deviate from tradi-
tional categories of nuisance conflict, the greater will be the risk
that the statutes are separating land uses that might never have
been separated. The risk is one of inefficiency-imposition of
unnecessary travel costs between land uses, or loss of economic
potential from unexploited land resources. 144 In this context,
invalidation of public restrictions that leave landowners without
reasonable value may be regarded as a crude judicial check on
the efficiency of the categorization process. It is one way of
expressing the idea that spillover demands arise in conflict and
need not be awarded or denied where no actual conflict does or
would ever exist. If the cost of advance generality is substantive
uncertainty, the reasonable-value limitation is one way of hold-
ing down that cost. This view of the doctrine suggests that it
need not be a constitutional taking rule. Rather, it is but
143. See authorities cited in note 113 supra.
144. See Ellickson, supra note 18, at 088-89, 706-07.
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another way of recognizing the efficiency value, which might
also be recognized through stricter review of initial category
decisions, or greater flexibility in application of categories, or
greater reliance on market mechanisms to check the efficiency of
advance decisions. To the extent alternative efficiency checks
are developed, there seems to be no reason to retain the reasona-
ble-value limitation as a feature of taking law. A corollary
proposition, already reflected in the distinction between "nui-
sance" taking cases (Hadacheck, for example) and the zoning,
or "quasi-nuisance" cases (Euclid and Nectow, for example) is
that where the particular categorization does reflect a substantial
land-use conflict, there need not be any reasonable-value con-
straint. In these terms, the refusal by the Court to strike down
the ordinance in Goldblatt'" because of insufficient evidence of
both the actual harm attributable to the regulated activity and
the cost imposed on the regulated party suggests that the Court
did not know which category the case belonged in and that the
burden was on the landowner to show both the insignificance of
the conflict supporting the restriction and the value impact of
the restriction itself. The Court's own citation 1 4 6 of both Penn-
sylvania Coal and Hadacheck evidences its uncertainty as to the
appropriate category.
Thus, for localized spillover conflicts between private par-
ties, the basic principles I have advanced seem to offer a consist-
ent approach to taking doctrine. There remains to be discussed,
however, one final category of localized conflicts-those be-
tween private claimants and the government as landowner and
user, exemplified by the airport cases such as United States v.
Causby.147  In Causby, the government asserted a spillover
demand through frequent and regular overflights of neighboring
private land by military aircraft at low altitudes. The Court
held the landowner entitled to compensation on the theory that
the government through its use had taken an "easement of
flight."' 48  Causby seems to have been decided on a physical
invasion theory. Justice Douglas noted for the majority:
The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the
land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface
of the land itself. We think that the landowner, as an incident
to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are
in the same category as invasions of the surface.' 49
145. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
146. Id. at 592, 594.
147. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
148. Id. at 261-62.
149. Id. at 265.
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Causby thus appears consistent with the earlier suggested princi-
ple that some spillover demands involving subjection over neigh-
boring land may be so obnoxious as to be tantamount to actual
territorial invasion. That the extreme case represented by Caus-
by may be treated as a physical invasion case does not, however,
provide a resolution of the less extreme cases that seem more
analogous to traditional nuisance cases. Causby merely serves
as a reminder that some spillover demands do impinge on core
concepts of ownership, however difficult it may be to find the
precise crossover point for characterization. For cases that do
fall short of actual physical invasions, the question remains what
difference does it make that the spillover is asserted by govern-
ment rather than by a private neighboring landowner.
Where the specific spillover challenged by the aggrieved
landowner involves local control rights previously distributed to
that landowner, the fact of prior distribution would seem to
place the case in the same category as the physical invasion
cases. Government, in attempting to supersede that claim
through its own inconsistent land use, is not saying that the
landowner's claim is intrinsically hostile to the interests of the
public at large, as it might in a common resource case,1 ; but
merely that it would be more convenient for the public to go
ahead with its project -without the annoyance of compensation.
The argument of convenience would be equally applicable to
any eminent domain case where compensation would normally be
required. The worthiness of the public project, however, seems
no more sufficient a basis on -which to justify avoidance of
compensation in these cases than it does where the prior right is
taken because another private landowner's right conflicts with it
and public efficiency goals would be better served by the trans-
fer. .r' In another sense, to say that the prior right may be
revoked merely on a showing of subsequent public advantage is
to say that it was never distributed in the first place. And while
we may wish to limit or condition the duration of such rights in
many cases, where the specific right has previously been distrib-
uted and no conditions imposed on its enjoyment or duration are
invoked to support the current government action, the mere
worthiness of the public project does not seem sufficient to
override the security of expectations associated with that right.
The discrimination, principle. also seems implicated by these
150. See text accompanying notes 1I4-60 infra. -
151. See Michelman, supra note 18, at 1193-96, 1234-35.
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cases, since to the extent previously[ distributed rights are other-
wise recognized, only the happenstance of physical proximity to
a conflicting government use would explain the denial.
In many cases, however, government will assert its spillover
demand against a private landowner to whom the conflicting
right has not been previously distributed. In such cases, it
seems necessary again to distinguish residential from nonresi-
dential claimants. To the extent that the expectation of residen-
tial amenity is regarded as part of the core of ownership expecta-
tions, the analysis suggested above for previously distributed
rights is equally applicable to conflicts between residential and
government land uses. In addition, the special discrimination
principle reflected by the goal of conferring minimum amounts
of residential amenity on all residents would be violated by the
creation of a special exception for those residents who happen to
find themselves next door to airports or sewage treatment plants.
Could such particularized denials of residential amenity be justi-
fied to the losers on the ground that they are simply being asked
to give up a right available to all other residential land users for
the greater public good represented by the particular project? I
think not.
To say that the residential amenity right should be recog-
nized as against claims asserted by government as landowner
does not fully resolve the problem, since there remains the
question of mode of protection. On this issue, some compro-
mise seems appropriate. I have suggested that the normal mode
of protection for residential amenity should be at least modeled
on injunctive relief, which provides maximum protection for
subjective values and blunts the impact of wealth effects. In the
case of conflicts with government activities, however, otherwise
socially desirable activities might be unduly inhibited by a re-
quirement of full compensation for subjective values of resi-
dents. The likely danger is holdout price claims by the few
individual residents remaining after their neighbors had volun-
tarily sold their rights to the government. The few might thus
have the power to block a worthy public project. These prob-
lems suggest adoption of the approach normally used in eminent
domain cases, where the basis of compensation is an objectively
determined market value. There seems no reason to give resi-
dential amenity claimants greater compensation rights than are
conferred upon those whose residences are physically occupied
by the public,
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The final and most difficult version of this problem is the
conflict between government and nonresidential landowner. Un-
der my approach, a nonresidential landowner asserting a spillov-
er right has, absent previously distributed rights, no expectation
of being permitted to continue such an assertion as against a
later, conflicting claim. In fact, the only expectation is that of
an opportunity to bid for the right against others. Against that
background, all that a landowner loses when government ac-
quires the spillover right for itself through its own land use, is
the chance to bid for the right. The payment requirement
seemed to be the only approach that would provide consistent
treatment for landowners where the only basis for distribution of
the spillover right is realization of efficiency goals. The two
relevant principles, then, are consistency and efficiency. Under
the consistency principle, nonresidential land users may assume
that their entitlement to spillover rights will depend on the
relative value of competing claimants' activities. In addition,
they may assume that spillover rights will not be conferred on
claimants whose activities dannot be regarded either as intrinsi-
cally worthy of such conferral Cr as worthy on the basis of
dollar-backed expressions of preference. On the basis of con-
sistency alone, conflicts between nonresidential and government
land users seem distinguishable from conflicts between nonresi-
dential users only, because of the inherent worthiness of the
particular government activity. So long as no other private
nonresidential claimants are receiving spillover rights on other
than a market basis, those who conflict with government activ-
ities will lack a persuasive claim of unfair treatment. Two key
assumptions inhere in this analysis, however.
The first is that spillover rights will not be distributed to
undeserving landowners. Government land-using activities fre-
quently confer spillover benefits on neighboring land. A typical
example is the highway interchange that greatly enhances the
economic potential of undeveloped farmland by making it a
likely location for motels, restaurants, and gas stations. To the
extent that such windfalls are mere by-products of an otherwise
defensible government locational decision, it cannot be said that
government in such cases is purposefully distributing spillovers
at all. Where the potential for such windfalls is great, however,
and the locational choice is not compelled (at least among a
number of equally suitable alternatives), one might at least
suspect that the decision-making process will be manipulated by
those who will gain from a particular choice, In such cases, the
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spillover conferral will be, or at least will be perceived as, a
purposeful distribution on the basis of no satisfying criteria.
Even where the integrity of the decision-making process is not
open to question, the consistency principle seems assaulted by
the fact of substantial consequential spillover benefits. On the
basis of result alone, the benefits conferred would seem to offer
a focus of resentment for those who are told they will not be
compensated for the loss of opportunities to acquire spillover
rights. As far as consistency is concerned, then, the "taking"
issue in these cases seems to be more of a "giving" issue, and I
would conclude that, wherever practically possible, consequen-
tial benefits conferred on landowners by public improvements
should be recouped by the public.152
The other key assumption is that efficiency gains to be
derived from the government activity will in fact exceed the
opportunities foreclosed by denying the spillover right to the
private landowner. Even assuming the inherent worthiness of
the public activity, the lack of any compensation requirement
may lead to a sloppy locational choice. On the other hand, a
compensation requirement might, other things being equal, per-
suade decisionmakers to choose the location that will necessitate
the lowest payment. The need for such an efficiency check
would vary with the availability of satisfactory criteria, other
than the likelihood of compensation, for choosing the location.
Where alternatives are available, however, some efficiency check
seems desirable, although practically difficult to implement. One
approach would be to compensate disappointed landowners on
the basis of the lost opportunity to bid against the government
for the spillover right, with the lost right valued by taking into
account the probability that the claimant would have successful-
ly competed against the government under normal market con-
ditions.1 3 Another approach would be to require the govern-
ment agency in charge of the locational decision to compute the
dollar losses imposed on landowners for all sites under consider-
152. For sorme ideas on method, see Wexler, Betterment Recovery:
A Financial Proposal for Sounder Land-Use Planning, 3 YALE REv. OF
L. & Soc. ACTION 192 (1973).
153. One available analogy is to the practice of permitting landown-
ers, when they can show a probability of rezoning for a more valuable
use, to claim higher awards in eminent domain proceedings than would
be appropriate for the land use authorized by a current zoning designa-
tion. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 291, 309-13 (1966); Limerick, The Effect
of Zoning on Valuation in Eminent Domain, 53 ILL, BAn. J. 956 (1965).
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ation, thereby providing at least a paper check on the efficiency
of the decision.
The cases involving nonlocalized spillover conflicts are per-
haps the most difficult of all. M.any regulations of land use
reflect a greater goal than simply distributing local spillover
rights among landowners. Such regulations are those that pro-
tect common public resources by setting maximum levels of
private imposition on air, water, highways, parks, and even
public morality. Given the generalized public interest in the
particular resource involved, these cases may accurately be
viewed as the category that presents genuine conflicts between
private claims and public rights. In the context of such con-
flicts, private claims based on previously distributed rights, effi-
ciency, or even residential amenity may have to yield to the
paramount public interest in protecting the common resource.
Previously distributed rights will rarely amount to an expli-
cit and unconditional right to impose on a public resource. In
fact, such an unconditional grant might be regarded as a viola-
tion of the state's duty to refrain from bargaining away the
police power. 5 4 And where the right previously distributed is
in the form of a spillover demand against neighboring land, it
would not seem to entail a claim against public resources gener-
ally so as to preclude later regulation for the benefit of the
common resource. 55 Efficiency also seems a weaker value in
the face of public resource protection, since there will often be
no satisfactory criteria for assessing the efficiency of the public
restriction. Public decisions as to the maximum levels of impos-
ition on common resources may be based on moral, aesthetic, or
other ideological or unquantifiable grounds. Apart from deni-
als of spillover demands that amount to deprivations of personal
liberty 56 or government action so absurd as to fall under the
154. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); cf. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicizl Intervention, 68 MicH L. REV.
471 (1970).
155. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 257
N.E.2d 870, 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (1970).
156. As, for example, a first amendment case. But see Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440, 2448 (1976):
The city's general zoning laws require all motion picture the-
aters to satisfy certain locational as well as other requirements;
we have no doubt that the municipality may control the location
of theaters as well as the location of other commercial establish-
ments, either by confining them to certain specified commercial
zones or by requiring that they be dispersed throughout the city.
The mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material pro-
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deferential rational basis standard of due process review, 157 there
seems to be no general principle of security of expectations that
would insulate private spillover demands from restrictions that
protect public resources. Even residential amenity claims seem
subject to this general principle, since the maximum imposition
levels will amount to no more than a societal decision as to the
currently available level of minimum residential amenity.
When, if ever, should the denials of spillover demands for
the sake of public resource protection be regarded as "takings"
of private rights? The most important principle for resolving
this question seems to be consistency, or prevention of discrimi-
nation. Where a generally applicable regulation distributes
compliance burdens widely, and produces reciprocal, or at least
widely distributed, benefits, there seems little cause for individu-
al complaint. It is only where the regulation is local rather than
general, or the burdens or benefits too narrow and not recipro-
cal, that a justifiable basis for resentment on the part of the
losers seems to appear. To explore this principle, I will examine
two cases-one involving a generally applicable regulation, the
other involving a localized one.
Mugler v. Kansas' 5" serves as a paradigm for the generally
applicable regulation to protect a common resource. While the
resource in that case was public morality and health, its princi-
ples seem equally applicable to more modern controversies in-
volving physical environmental resources. Mugler involved a
spillover conflict between individual land users who manufac-
tured alcoholic beverages, and the public at large. No legiti-
mate expectation was defeated by the regulation, unless it can be
said that any spillover demand manifested by current use is
insulated against a subsequent public decision that that use
imposes unduly on a public resource. Such a principle of
insulation would amount to adoption of a general principle of
prior appropriation of spillover rights. If that principle is inap-
propriate in the context of conflicts between private claimants,
as discussed earlier, it would seem even less appropriate where
one of the claimants is the public. Is there any other basis for
feeling that Mugler was wrongly decided? It may be that from
tected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other
licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating
these ordinances.
157. See Sax, supra note 120, at 171. See generally P. BREST, PRoc-
ESSES oF CONSTxTuTiONAL DECiSiONmAKIN 1004-10 (1975).
158. 123 US. 623 (1887).
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a contemporary perspective the prohibition of alcoholic bever-
ages was itself a silly enterprise, and that it was therefore not
worth the cost-in economic loss to brewers such as Mugler-to
attempt to achieve an unattainable and misguided goal. The
modern version of the problem, however, may be the smoke-
generating factory that has been operating for some years and is
suddenly (as a result of new scientific knowledge) identified as
producing a carcinogen in its smoke. Is there any ethical basis
for concluding that the factory has a right, backed up by a claim
for compensation, to continue prodzucing the noxious substance,
even if the only available means of compliance will result in
severe curtailment or cessation of the factory's activities?
Even if the regulation in Mugler did not defeat legitimate
expectations, it is necessary to inqutire whether it raised issues of
discrimination. Since the regulation was generally applicable,
there is no problem of some persons being exempted from its
provisions and receiving without charge the very spillover right
taken away from those burdened by the regulation. Such cases
would seem to create a basis of resentment to the extent that the
exempted cannot be distinguished -n any satisfactory basis from
the burdened. Even regulations without exemptions may be
perceived as discriminatory if there is some basis for regarding
them as having been enacted to serve the interest of a narrow
beneficiary class. This notion too seems inapplicable to Mugler,
where the beneficiary class presumably included at least all those
who, through the majoritarian political process, had imposed
prohibition by constitutional amendment and implementing stat-
utes. There is a sense of discrimination that may arise even in a
case where the regulation is generally applicable and the benefi-
ciary class is large. Despite the generality of its application, the
actual burden of compliance with the regulation will fall primar-
ily on those currently engaged in the now-prohibited activity.
Only those whose businesses related to alcoholic beverages suf-
fered the immediate monetary losses in Mugler. The answer to
such complaints in the Mugler context is that the regulation
picked on the group whose activities were in fact offensive to
public morality, and that any other currently legitimate activity
remained exposed to the same risk of later changes in public
standards of resource imposition.
There may be cases, however, where the class of persons
burdened by a generally applicable regulation possesses some
identifiable trait other than that of engaging in the prohibited
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activity. For example, if in the pursuit of public aesthetic
notions a regulation is promulgated banning outdoor clothes
drying, it might be perceived as discriminatory to the extent that
it imposes on those who cannot afford automatic clothes dryers.
While the regulation might be regarded as serving the goal of
residential amenity by establishing minimum standards, its effect
would be to undermine the goal of equalizing residential ameni-
ty by forcing poorer persons to sacrifice in order to buy clothes
dryers, to accept the additional cost in time or money of going to
laundromats, or to suffer a loss in residential amenity by drying
their clothes inside. In such circumstances, the goal of equal-
ized residential amenity might be better served by subsidizing
the availability of clothes dryers than by banning the offensive
activity. A similar approach would support programs for aiding
employees of factories that are closed to stop air pollution.
For the most part, the generally applicable common re-
source regulations are unlikely to present serious problems of
discrimination. Where the regulations are locally applicable,
however, or where they deny to some a spillover right simulta-
neously conferred on others, serious discrimination issues arise.
If the common resource is itself localized, a lake, for instance, no
discrimination problem arises from the mere fact that the regula-
tion applies only to those whose spillover claims may impinge on
the resource. But where some are denied and some are granted
the same spillover right against the same public resource, the
principle of consistency would seem to demand some justifica-
tion for the differential treatment. Such problems arise fre-
quently with respect to zoning ordinances, which are promulgat-
ed on a local rather than a statewide basis and which apply
differentially throughout the jurisdictions that enact them. While
these issues will be covered extensively in the next section, I will
present one further case now to complete the inventory of taking
problems.
Welch v. Swasey' 59 serves as a doctrinal bridge between
nuisance law and zoning and illustrates the potential for discrim-
ination when public resources are protected on other than a
generalized basis. Welch involved Massachusetts statutes regu-
lating the heights of buildings in the City of Boston. The
statutory scheme divided Boston into two districts, District A,
the majority of the buildings in which were currently devoted to
commercial use, and District B, the majority of the buildings in
159. 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
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which were devoted to residential use. Landowners were au-
thorized to construct buildings to a height of 125 feet in District
A, but buildings in District B were limited to a height of 80
feet.160  A complaining District B landowner challenged the
differential height rules. Since the complainant conceded the
validity of the basic 125-foot limit, the focus of the case was on
the differential rules applicable to the two districts. The United
States Supreme Court upheld the scheme as one designed to
protect against fire. As such, the scheme may be regarded as
limiting imposition on the common resource of public safety, or
as limiting the burden of firefighting.
To the extent the statute based district designations on
existing uses, the case may be regarded as a traditional nuisance
case. The Court assumed that fire danger would be greater in
residential neighborhoods than commercial ones, given less like-
lihood of fireproof construction in the former and the risk to
sleeping residents. So viewed, the case seems to involve a fair
principle of differentiation, since the danger to public safety
arose only from the existence of a spillover conflict between
residential and nonresidential users, which conflict was not
present in the nonresidential areas. There was thus no reason to
impose the stricter limitation on landowners whose property did
not impose a spillover demand on residents. Under traditional
nuisance principles, it would be inappropriate to deny the spill-
over right to landowners not currently in conflict with residents.
But the case also went beyond traditional nuisance law to the
extent it involved prospective distribution of spillover rights. The
undeveloped portions of the city became designated as "A" or
"B" under the ordinance. A landowner located in an undevel-
oped area of District B, and therefore not currently in conflict
with any residences, was nevertheless subjected to the District B
height restriction, whereas a landowner in an undeveloped area
of District A remained free to build to the maximum permitted
height. Efficiency goals may be well served by such a scheme,
since locational uncertainty is reduced and costly dislocations
need not be confronted. On the other hand, landowners in the
undeveloped areas of Districts A and B seem similarly situated,
inasmuch as neither one is involved in a current spillover con-
flict and the need for some boundaries does not itself imply
choice of any particular boundaries. The more undeveloped the
area, the more difficult it will be to persuade those denied the
160. With a few exceptions. See id. at 92-95 n.1.
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spillover demand that it has been awarded to others on a satis-
factory basis, especially if the land of both classes is intrinsically
suitable for either designation. The Court in Welch rejected the
landowner's argument that the stricter limit imposed in District
B amounted to a taking, and also rejected the same landowner's
claim that the limit amounted to an equal protection violation.
Welch itself may not have involved a true discrimination prob-
lem to the extent that its after-the-fact determination was analo-
gous to nuisance law. But where the distribution of spillover
claims becomes prospective in order to achieve efficiency goals,
such claims may be distributed on a basis that fails to satisfy any
ethical criteria. The problem in Welch, if it is regarded as a
case of prospective distribution, was not that the disappointed
landowner was restricted for the sake of residential amenity, but
that the fortunate landowners in District A received permission
to build to the maximum limit for no other reason than they
happened to be located in the district chosen for that designa-
tion. Here again the problem seems to be one of "giving" rather
than taking; the discrimination problem arose because the win-
ners were simply given what they should have paid for.
V. ZONING
Zoning seeks to avoid or at least to minimize the costs of
spillover conflicts over land use by designating in advance par-
ticular uses for particular parcels of land. The basic method is
simple. Select and prepare a list of categories of land uses,
grouping similar ones within categories and placing those sup-
posed to conflict with one another in different categories. Then
take the list and apply its scheme to a map of the area in
question, designating districts for the chosen categories. Such a
procedure gives advance notice to landowners of what may be
done in their designated districts (subjection spillover rights)
and what may not be done (exclusion spillover rights). Two
other techniques are basic to zoning. Through nonconforming
use doctrine, prior existing land uses are insulated from subse-
quent changes of designation. And through a range of proce-
dural devices, including variances, conditional uses, and rezon-
ings, changes in designation are permitted over time. Traditional
zoning practice relegates these determinations to local govern-
ment discretion, with the power conferred on the local govern-
ments by the state. The spillover rights bestowed on landown-
ers by the zoning process are not marketed, but conferred
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initially by legislative decision. Subsequent changes are accom-
plished through a combination of legislative and administrative
techniques. By awarding or withholding spillover rights, zoning
decisions enhance or depreciate market value of designated
tracts of land. The present section will investigate the extent to
which the values of efficiency, residential amenity, and prior
appropriation are reflected in the zoning process.
The principal efficiency gain thought to be produced by
zoning is the avoidance of locational uncertainty and the conse-
quent avoidance of unnecessary and costly interactions between
conflicting land uses.1 1 An ideal zoning scheme would, after
categorizing on some minimal basis of generality, allot just
enough land for each category of use, given contemporary de-
mands for different kinds of land uses. In a number of ways,
however, zoning, in its ostensible pursuit of efficiency goals,
produces contrary results. For one thing, the categorization
technique is not a satisfactory substitute for the actual conflict
standard of nuisance law. The selected categories may often
separate land uses more rigidly than they would have been if left
to nuisance litigation.162  This likelihood is enhanced by the
failure of zoning to offer any subsequent market check on the
accuracy of the chosen categories. Once established, zoning
designations can be changed only through the political process,
which will not necessarily result in a change even though market
transactions would likely have prcduced it. Another counter-
efficient aspect of zoning is its initial availability on an unpriced
basis. Those who regulate can appropriate spillover benefits to
themselves without any check on the efficiency of their
choices.163 Thus, if a group of landowners who have the power
to zone themselves and others wish to employ a particularly
exclusive designation that reflects their own level of amenity,
they may be able to do so even if the designation chosen imposes
costs in excess of the gains realized. 6 4  Here again, the lack of
161. See, e.g., M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE
UNITED STATES 169-78 (1971); J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES
72-73 (paperback ed. 1968); E.J. MIsHAN, Pareto Optimality and the Law,
in WELFARE EcoNoMcs, supra note 11, at 225.
162. See Elllckson, supra note 18, at 706-07.
163. See J. DELAFoNs, LAxD-USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 81-
82, 97-98 (1962); F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LBERTY 351 (1960);
Tarlock, Toward a Revised Theory of Zoning, 1972 LAND USE CONTROLS
ANN. 141, 144 (1973).
164. For an excellent analysis, see Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE
L.J. 1418, 1421-29 (1969).
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any subsequent market test further reinforces and insulates the
rigidity of the original decision, since any subsequent political
test of the decision will force the minority again to contend with
the selfish majority that imposed it in the first place.
Zoning does promote residential amenity, but what is
promoted is the residential amenity of the few at the expense of
the many. The roots of this problem go back to the Euclid
case' 6 5 and the origins of contemporary zoning. The principal
rationale of Euclid was the notion that nuisance law could be
extended to the prospective prevention of nuisances on a cate-
gorical basis. But Euclid went far beyond nuisance law' 66 in its
affirmation of the idea that apartment houses in single-family
districts could be regarded as tantamount to nuisances and
categorically treated as such.1 67 It was a sure step from that
notion to the proposition that density of population could be
regulated through devices such as minimum lot sizes and mini-
mum floor spaces, without regard to whether actual nuisance
impacts would be prevented by the regulation in question.16 8
This scheme of residential separation again illustrates the effi-
ciency problems noted above with respect to category choices,
and the lack of any cost check on particular decisions to designate
areas. But the residential separation aspect of zoning also
implicates the residential amenity value. Instead of being a
scheme for protecting residential amenity generally against con-
165. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
166. See Scoville v. Renalter, 162 Conn. 67, 291 A.2d 222 (1971);
Moore v. Mayor of Statesboro, 228 Ga. 619, 187 S.E.2d 531 (1972); D.
MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 34 (1971). See also Crecine, Davis,
& Jackson, Urban Property Markets: Some Empirical Results and their
Implications for Municipal Zoning, 10 J. LAw & EcoN. 79, 82 (1967).
167. 272 U.S. at 395.
168. See, e.g., authorities cited in note 5 supra; Lionshead Lake, Inc.
v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed,
344 U.S. 919 (1953); Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 6
N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959); J. UKELES, THE CON-
SEQUENCES OF MUNICIPAL ZONING 28-29 (1964); Williams & Norman, Ex-
clusionary Land-Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey,
4 LAND-USE CONTROLS Q., No. 4, at 1 (1970).
Babcock suggests that such ordinances are based primarily on "so-
cial" motivation. See R. BABcocF, THE ZONING GAME 31, 37-38 (paper-
back ed. 1966). The realities of local government finance give rise to
what is called "fiscal" zoning, through which costs are imposed outside
the jurisdiction. See Frieden, Housing and National Urban Goals: Old
Policies and New Realities, in THE METRoPoLITAN ENIGMA-INQUIRIES
INo THE NATURE AND DIMENsIONs OF AmERICA'S "URBAN CRI SS" 159, 193-
94 (J. Wilson ed. 1968); Garber, The Real Property Tax and Exclusion-




flicting nonresidential uses, as nuisance law had been, zoning
became a scheme for protecting from all other residential uses
the highest level of residential amenity that can command politi-
cal power in a regulating community.
Zoning therefore offers a hierarchical approach to the
protection of residential amenity, with those who are politically
able aggregating to themselves, at the expense of others without
such power, disproportionate amounts of residential amenity.
The disproportionate results do not follow from the mere fact of
residential separation. Zoning could, in theory, allocate suffi-
cient areas to every variety of residential use otherwise available
through the market and award :o each its requisite level of
residential amenity. I argued above that separation alone prob-
ably ill serves a goal of equalized residential amenity.1 9 But
even assuming that separation might be consistent with the
residential amenity value, separation combined with the availa-
bility of greater-than-minimal amounts of amenity on an un-
priced basis produces disproportionate results. The spillover
rights involved are of the exclusion variety. If those who desire
to exclude in order to attain a higher level of residential amenity
for themselves can do so without paying for the privilege, they
are likely to acquire as much as is, politically feasible. If those
who acquire the greater quantities of residential amenity rights
are also those who already possess greater quantities of wealth
and power, the burden of their acquisition is likely to fall upon
relatively poor and powerless segments of the community. 170
Neither the efficiency value nor the residential amenity value is
served by permitting the acquisition of such rights. In fact,
those who receive exclusive residential amenity rights are receiv-
ing a windfall from the public under circumstances the distribu-
tional basis of which fails to satisfy any criteria of desert.
If efficiency is ill served and residential amenity turned
inside-out, how does zoning deal with prior appropriation?
Zoning raises two kinds of prior appropriation issues-claims
by individuals and claims by political units. The first arises
when a landowner claims to have acquired a spillover right
through an initial land use in an otherwise undeveloped area.
With respect to such claims by individuals, zoning has generally
refused to recognize spillover rights based solely on prior appro-
169. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
170. See D. HAR v , SOCIAL JUSTICE .AND THE CITY 67 (1973); W.
Hmscir, URBAN EcoNoMIc AN1AYsis 423-24 (1973); Davis, Economic Ele-
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priation through either previous use or previous receipt of a
zoning designation authorizing such use. The cases are replete
with statements to the effect that one does not receive a vested
right to the continuation of a particular zoning designation. 1' 1
One exception to this approach is the nonconforming use
doctrine, which does legitimize, under severe constraints, 1'7 2 ex-
isting land uses not unlawful when initiated. I suggested above
that this practice, since it seems based largely on considerations
of efficiency, does not represent a significant deviation from
nuisance law and that it does not represent adoption of a prior
appropriation principle. Given the uncertainty of zoning's cate-
gory choices, efficiency goals might be ill served by the forced
termination of a prior use that might not be perceived as hostile
by later users who comply with the zoning designation. The
efficiency problem is underscored by the lack of any market
check, since zoning normally either legitimizes the prior use or
orders it out, without opportunity for market negotiations over
the question of its remaining. Courts have not hesitated to
uphold the termination, without compensation, of nonconform-
ing uses that do present a genuine conflict with later authorized
land uses.'7 8
ments in Municipal Zoning Decisions, 39 LAND ECON. 375, 379-83 (1963);
Note, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Economics of Serrano and
Shaw, 82 YALE L.J. 89, 117-18 (1972); Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE
L.J. 1418 (1969). See generally L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AND
HOUSING COSTS (1973).
171. See 1 R. ANDERsON, AwmucAN LAw OF ZONING § 4.27 (1968, 1975
Supp.).
172. The constraints include a threshold requirement that the use be
sufficiently well established before it is entitled to insulation from sub-
sequent zoning changes. See, e.g., Hawkinson v. County of Itasca, 231
N.W.2d 279 (Minn. 1975). In addition, recognized nonconforming uses
typically are subject to restrictions, such as prohibitions on expansion
or improvement of the activity, limits on the right to rebuild after cat-
astrophic destruction, or periods of "amortization" in which the noncon-
forming use must be phased out. See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note
171, §§ 6.30-.71.
173. See, e.g., Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los An-
geles, 43 CaL 2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954); Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal.
304, 295 P. 14 (1930); Fallen Leaf Pro. Ass'n v. South Tahoe Pub. Util.
Dist., 46 Cal. App. 3d 816, 120 Cal Rptr. 538 (1975); Perkins v. City of
Coral Gables, 57 So. 2d 663 (Fla. Ct. App. 1952); Chicago v. Reuter Bros.
Iron Works, 398 I1. 202, 75 N.E.2d 355 (1947); Town of Surry v. Starkey,
115 N.H. 31, 332 A.2d 172 (1975); cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915). See




The nonconforming use doctrine may also serve efficiency
goals in another way. Many uses excluded from a particular
area, such as stores excluded from a residential zone, might
produce a conflict if there were too many of them in relation to
the number of residences. Such conflict simply fails to material-
ize, however, except perhaps in the most localized fashion (next
door?), if the number is restricted to one or two. The single
store in a residential area may be perceived as a great conven-
ience to neighboring residents. Given the hostility of most
courts to the explicit use of zoning to limit the number of any
class of commercial activities in a designated area,1 7 4 noncon-
forming use doctrine provides a per se rule (prior use) that
achieves an equivalent result. As -a economic matter, however,
whether the first user is recognized under nonconforming use
doctrine or issued an administrative monopoly under a numeri-
cal scheme, a market restriction has been imposed that enhances
the competitive position of the recipient as against others in the
same business. If it is not an ethical claim based on firstness,
but merely a consideration of efficiency, that distinguishes the
case of the nonconforming use recipient, there seems to be no
justification for conferring the windfall of localized monopoly on
the nonconforming user without exacting a charge for the privi-
lege.
The most serious version of prior appropriation authorized
by zoning is not at the landowner level but at the jurisdictional
one. By conferring the regulatory power on individual munici-
palities, zoning law authorizes them to appropriate spillover
rights as against other communities. With the power residing in
jurisdictional entities, the practical power will reside in those
with political control within those entities. And since a key
feature of zoning is the power to designate areas that will receive
spillover rights of exclusion, local regulation permits the acquisi-
tion of such claims by those who happen to reside in the par-
174. See, e.g., Ex parte White, 195 Cal. 516, 234 P. 396 (1925); Wick-
ham v. Becker, 96 CaL App. 443, 274 P. 397 (1929); Wyatt v. City of
Pensacola, 196 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Suburban Ready-Mix
Corp. v. Village of Wheeling, 25 fIl. 2d 548, 185 N.E.2d 665 (1962); Tex-
aco, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 73 N.J. Super. 313, 179 A.2d 768 (1962);
Metro 500, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn Park, 297 Minn. 294, 211 N.W.2d 358(1973); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962).
But see Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971) (limit on
number of gas stations upheld on a nuisance prevention theory). See
generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 171, § 7.28, at 549-50 (1968); Van Al-
styne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1971).
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ticular community when it enacts its zoning ordinance. Such
an ordinance may well succeed in preventing the enlargement of
the community to include those who might control the political
process for other goals, or perhaps at least in limiting entry to
those likely to agree with the goals of the existing community.
What I have just characterized as prior appropriation of
local control rights is frequently hailed as local autonomy or
community control, supposedly a recognized societal value.1 '5
Prior appropriation alone, I suggested earlier, is no basis for the
award of spillover claims. Can the two concepts be reconciled?
The values associated with community control and local auton-
omy would seem to be those associated with individualism and
personal autonomy-control over one's life, freedom from out-
side interference. But to confer power over residential amenity
on the basis of local jurisdictional organization is to permit
appropriation of such rights as against persons in other com-
munities. With a fixed stock of residential amenity ultimately
limited by the available land area, to give control to some is to
take it away from others. Those who have the first opportunity
to set their own minimum level of amenity will be able to
deprive others of the chance to acquire increased levels of such
amenity. If there is no persuasive ethical case for permitting
individuals to acquire spillover rights on the basis of prior
appropriation alone, there seems to be no case for permitting
groups of individuals to acquire those rights on that basis.
Any recognition of personal autonomy usually involves the
possibility of spillover problems. Others may be offended or
imposed upon by the exercise of the individual rights within the
assigned sphere of autonomy, as with constitutional rights of
privacy ' 76 or first amendment rights. 77  In such cases, our
175. See, e.g., Bergin, Price-Exclusionary Zoning: A Social Analysis,
47 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 1 (1972). Bergin, without explaining or elaborating
upon the concept, sees "local decisional autonomy" as the value most
threatened by efforts to outlaw or restrict exclusionary zoning. Cf. City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976); Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973). See also Hagman, Regionalized
Decentralism: A Model for Rapprochement in Los Angeles, 58 GEo. L.J.
901, 916-18 (1970); Simmons, Home Rule and Exclusionary Zoning: An
Impediment to Low and Moderate Income Housing, 33 Omo ST. L.J. 621,
623 (1972).
176. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973).
177. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
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notion of individual liberty leads to the conclusion that the
particular subject matter is within the scope of individual discre-
tion, despite its spillover effects. So long as local regulation
leads to the acquisition of spillover rights in a way that deprives
others of similar opportunities, a personal autonomy defense of
the practice would have to explain why the autonomy of some
residents is more significant than others. The only explanation
for the differential would again be prior appropriation, which, as
I have argued, fails. In fact, to the extent that principles of
autonomy are thought to reflect our societal notions of self-
worth, self-respect, or personal liberty, the applicable principle
for distribution of residential amenity would seem to be the
distribution of minimum levels of residential amenity to all
residents.
That residential amenity principle would require a substan-
tive sharing of such amenity in order to achieve the distribution
of minimum amounts, and any procedural decision to permit
regulation on a local autonomy basis seems fundamentally in-
consistent with such a principle. If local regulation is to contin-
ue, the residential amenity principle can be satisfied only if the
power to regulate is granted upon conditions that limit its sub-
stantive potential, as by specifying the maximum levels of amen-
ity that can be achieved through regulation by a particular
regulating entity. The very process of delegating regulatory
power is a method for distributing local environmental control
rights to the recipients of that power. Under current law,
subject only to judicial limitations in cases of gross inefficiency
or egregious appetite for maximum levels of amenity, such
distribution is made primarily on the basis of prior appropration.
The aggregate impact of traditional zoning has thus been to
permit the appropriation of much greater than minimal spillover
rights of exclusion by regulating communities in a position to
preserve such a level of amenity. The result has been that
possibilities for achievement of residential amenity by other
communities or individuals are reduced and land market effi-
ciency goals thwarted. Litigation directed at exclusionary zoning
sought (and is still seeking) to blunt these effects, but, with
one notable exception,1 7 8 even the favorable judicial decisions" 9
178. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt.
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
179. E.g., Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd., 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567
(1971); Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35 (1957);
Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964); Chris-
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have not challenged the basic values reflected in local zoning.
And recent contrary developments, to be discussed below, seem
designed more to support than weaken the counter-efficient and
prior appropriation features of zoning. These contrary develop-
ments involve the use of zoning to protect common resources,
both physical and financial.
An assumption of traditional zoning law, which, I suggest-
ed earlier, served as one efficiency check on regulations, has
been that whenever regulation goes beyond the control of an
activity that would be regarded as a traditional nuisance, the
landowner may be regulated up to the point where the land
retains some reasonable value, but no further. This assumption
has now been called into question in, at least, Wisconsin by
language in its supreme court's decision in Just v. Marrinette
County.8 0 The case involved a state program for regulating
use of shorelands. Under the statutory scheme, the owner of
land designated as "wetland" under the statute could not fill in
the land without first obtaining a permit from the local govern-
ment. Owners of designated land who commenced fill-in opera-
tions without having sought such a permit were charged with a
violation of the statute. In upholding the statute the court
announced a new view of landowner expectations, saying that
one does not necessarily have the expectation of exploiting one's
land for its economic value, where exploitation would necessarily
involve changing the land from its natural state. Government
programs like that upheld in Just are a product of increasing
awareness of the subtle and often disastrous impacts of human
activities, especially land development, on the surrounding hu-
man and natural environment. This increasing awareness may
be viewed as a more sophisticated kind of nuisance law; with
greater scientific knowledge our concept of harm changes.
tine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962);
Oakwood at Madison v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283
A.2d 353 (1971); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d
765 (1970); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107
S.E.2d 390 (1959). The literature on exclusionary zoning has been ex-
tensive. See, e.g., Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices:
An Examination of the Current Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REv. 1111
(1972); Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1971); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protec-
tion, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); Note, Large Lot Zon-
ing, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969). For a dissenting view, see Bergin, Price-
Exclusionary Zoning: A Social Analysis, 47 ST. Join's L.'REv. 1 (1972).
180. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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Along with greater scientific knowledge has come an increasing
appreciation of the risks that may follow any change in the
natural environment, risks not only to plant and animal life, but
risks to people as well. While these changing perceptions may
justify extreme regulations to protect natural resources-regula-
tions that are consistent with the view that no landowner has a
valid expectation of imposing a spillover demand on a common
resource-such regulations may also operate to insulate and
enhance the residential amenity of some, while further reducing
the possibilities of amenity for others.
The regulations in Just were conceived at the statewide
level, and, as such, may be regarded as common resource protec-
tion for the public generally. Other cases, however, have in-
volved the same goal, protection of local environmental re-
sources, implemented by local decision alone.' 5 ' Steel Hill
Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton,s2 for example, in-
volved a small rural town in New Hampshire, a town with a
basic population of 1000 that increased to 2000 in the summer
because of its attractiveness as a summer resort. A developer
had purchased a large amount of land in the town with a view
toward constructing summer homes for about 500 families. At
the time of purchase, the land was zoned for minimum lot sizes
of three-fourths of an acre. As a result of a public outcry
against the developer's plan, the town rezoned the entire tract,
placing 70 percent of the land in a new "Forest Conservation
Zone," with a six-acre minimum lot size requirement, and the
remainder in an "Agricultural Zone," with a three-acre mini-
mum lot size. The environmental fears of the townsfolk includ-
ed water pollution, interference with smelt spawning, increased
traffic, and air pollution. They also generally feared destruction
of the rural character of the town.. There was little or no data
offered to back up these fears, but the court nevertheless upheld
the ordinance, concluding that there was enough basis for con-
cern to justify an interim program of restrictions (the ordinance
181. See, e.g., Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th
Cir. 1974); Western Int'l Hotels v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 387
F. Supp. 429 (D. Nev. 1975); Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App.
3d 305, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974); Candlestick Properties, Inc., v. San
Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 897 (1970); Wilson v. Town of Sherborn, 326 N.E.2d 922 (Mass.
1975); S. Volpe & Co. v. Board of Appeals, 348 N.E.2d 807 (App. Ct.
Mass. 1976); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975); cf. Con-
struction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
182. 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
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had been in effect nearly two years at the time the case was
decided) to enable the town to explore the anticipated environ-
mental problems. Here again there was a significant shift away
from the requirements of nuisance law, inasmuch as the town
regulated not merely to prevent demonstrable harm, but to give
itself a chance to assess the possibility of harm. Regulatory
schemes such as that upheld in Steel Hill amount to prior
appropriation of physical environmental resources by the citizens
of the regulating locality. To permit a town to set the maximum
level of imposition on its resources is equivalent to saying that
the current residents of that town own the public resource as
against would-be participants from elsewhere in the state or
country. And the particular technique upheld-large-lot zon-
ing-is traditionally associated with the worst exclusionary zon-
ing.
The principles of Steel Hill have received support from the
United States Supreme Court in its decision in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas.8 3 There, presented with its first opportunity
in 45 years to review the Euclid decision, the Court upheld the
right of a small residential town to use extreme measures to
preserve its established character and way of life. The town was
zoned exclusively for single-family residential use on minimum
acreage lots. The zoning ordinance went on to define "family"
for purposes of its ordinance as any size group of persons related
by blood, marriage, or adoption, and a group of no more than
two unrelated persons. The ordinance was applied to prevent a
single person owning a large house from renting out the house to
a group of six graduate students from a nearby university.
Despite claims by the students and the affected landowner that
the ordinance infringed on their constitutional rights of privacy
and freedom of association, the Court upheld the ordinance as a
valid means of regulating density in the community. In very
strong terms, Justice Douglas's majority opinion recognized the
right of the town to preserve its quiet residential way of life-in
effect, to seal itself off from outside population or economic pres-
sures. The message again, at least in terms of federal constitu-
tional law, is that the physical environment of a locality belongs
to those who have it, and they can regulate to keep it.84
183. 416 U.S. 1 (1974), rev'g 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
184. Compare the contrary theme expressed in commerce clause
cases involving state attempts to appropriate local natural resources as
against the claims of other states or citizens of other states, See, e.g.,
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Similar recent developments have recognized prior appro-
priation of local financial resources. Zoning law decisions have
traditionally struck down explicit "fiscal zoning," that is, zon-
ing to keep down the amount of local property taxes, which
is usually achieved by excluding high-density residential uses
supposed to demand more from local budgets than they contrib-
ute in taxes and by encouraging the entry of "clean" industries
that will contribute more than they demand. 185 Now, however,
under the guise of "managed growth" or "growth control,"
explicit fiscal zoning has achieved legitimacy.
In the leading case, Golden v. Planning Board,8 6 the New
York Court of Appeals upheld the so-called "Ramapo plan" for
"phased development," which extended the basic zoning tech-
nique of allocating land uses over territorial space to allocation of
land uses over time. Under the scheme, the town announced its
capital improvement plan for the next 18 years, with respect to
services such as sanitary sewers, drainage facilities, public parks
or recreational facilities, roads, and firehouses. It implemented
a regulation that withheld from any developer permission to
subdivide land until the land had been provided with a sufficient
level of those services, even if that meant waiting anywhere up to
18 years for the privilege. The only alternative under the
scheme was to assume personally the cost of providing the
requisite level of services, rather than waiting to have them
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923);
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); cf. Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). See also W. LOcKmART, Y. KAm-
IsAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 387-88 (4th ed. 1975).
185. See, e.g., Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324 N.E.2d
406 (1975); Glassey v. County of Tazewell, 11 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 297
N.E.2d 235 (1973); Green v. Township of Lima, 40 Mich. App. 655, 199
N.W.2d 243 (1972); Schere v. Township of Freehold, 119 N.J. Super. 433,
292 A.2d 35 (1972); Molino v. Mayor & Council of Glassboro, 116 N.J.
Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971); Camp Hill Dev. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commonwealth 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974); Glocester
v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, Inc., 111 R.I. 120, 300 A.2d 465 (1973).
Many of the large-lot size zoning cases may be regarded as involving
more implicit forms of fiscal zoning. For an extensive analysis, see the
lengthy opinion in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). For a recent analysis
suggesting that the actual fiscal impacts of population growth may be
misunderstood, with "fiscal" zoning resulting either from ignorance or
nonfiscal motives, see James & Windsor, Fiscal Zoning, Fiscal Reform,
and Exclusionary Land Use Controls, 42 J. Am. INsT. PLnANms 130
(1976).
186. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
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provided through general taxation, a cost that would in most
cases be prohibitive.18 7 The principle affirmed in Golden is that
a town can regulate the amount of development by regulating
the level of services that it is willing to provide and by limiting
the amounts it is willing to tax itself for providing them. In
short, a town owns its taxable wealth, which it may appropriate
for its current residents as against claims of those who wish to
locate in the community.18 8
Thus far, I have characterized zoning as a means of distrib-
uting spillover claims to serve prior appropriation values and
discriminatory residential amenity values, both of which seem
inconsistent with the goals of land-use regulation that I set forth
earlier in this Article. In addition, I have suggested that effi-
ciency goals are also ill served by contemporary zoning practice,
inasmuch as tests of efficiency are absent from the process. A
further aspect of zoning must now be considered, for in some
respects zoning results in the distribution of valuable spillover
187. For a good critical analysis of the "Ramapo" plan, see POTOMAC
INSTITUTE, CONTROLLING URBAN GROWTH-BUT FOR WHOM? (1973). For
additional readings on the subject of timing and sequential controls, see
the three-volume anthology, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH (R.
Scott ed. 1975).
188. For other recent examples of legitimized fiscal prior appropria-
tion, see, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'g 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976); Builders Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529
P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974); Gaslight Villa, Inc. v. Governing
Body, 213 Kan. 812, 518 P.2d 410 (1974); Palmer v. Township of Superior,
60 Mich. App. 664, 233 N.W.2d 14 (1975); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
11 Pa. Commonwealth 607, 314 A.2d 565 (1974).
Closely related to, and often accompanying, the growth control tech-
nique is subdivision exaction, whereby developers are required to con-
tribute land or money for such purposes as schools or recreation areas
as a precondition to receipt of development permission. Where the tech-
nique is applied to facilities or services normally provided through gen-
eral taxation rather than special assessment, the assumption seems to be,
as with growth control or local environmental zoning, that the current
residents of the regulating jurisdiction "own" their present level of fiscal
or environmental amenity and can therefore charge newcomers for the
privilege of joining the community. To the extent that costs associated
with development are successfully passed along to the developers or new
residents, the previous residents avoid any dilution of their previously
acquired amenity level. The leading case is Associated Home Builders
of the Greater East Bay, Inc., v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). For other cases upholding an
expansive power of subdivison exaction, see Aunt Hack Ridge Estates,
Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 272 A.2d 880 (1970); Billings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964);
Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 305
N.Y.S.2d 294 (1966); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d
608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
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rights without any rational basis at all. Both at the point of
initial designation, and again whenever any zoning change is
authorized, zoning decisions affect land values by conferring or
withholding spillover rights.1, 9 Even an ideal system of zoning,
one that allocated areas sufficient for the full range of land uses
currently demanded by the market, would confer valuable prem-
iums on some areas, so long as some land uses are regarded as
more profitable than others. To the extent that significant
amounts of land are topographically suitable for a wide range of
land uses, designation of land for a use that is particularly
valuable will confer a great benefit on the fortunate landowner
as compared with owners of similar land not designated for
equally profitable uses. That zoning must designate land uses
in advance to avoid the locationaL uncertainty of nuisance law
does not justify the selection of -particular landowners for the
more valuable uses. The basic problem is one of "givings."
And where the land uses designated are ones for which an
insufficient area has been designated generally-an insufficiency
likely to result from the prior appropriation and perverse resi-
dential amenity features of zoning-the value differentials are
likely to be much greater, as where the overwhelmingly single-
family suburb designates a small area for apartment construction
in the face of a large market demand for such residential accom-
modations.
The economic basis of these "givings" may be regarded as
a combination of value transfer'9" and supply restriction 9 ' ef-
189. See M. CLAwsoN, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED
STATES 182-86 (1971); F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 350-51
(1960); D. HAGMAN, PuBLIc PLANNING JIND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT 547-50, 802 (1973); G. IV[LGRAM, U.S. LAND PRICEs-DInuc-
TIONS AND DYNAmIcs 46-47 (1968) (Research Report No. 13 prepared for
the consideration of the National Commission on Urban Problems);
Haar, Introduction, in LAW AND LAND xv (C. Haar ed. 1964); Lichfield,
Development Values and Controls, in TiL-m REGIONAL CITY 134, 139-41 (D.
Senior ed. 1966); Woodruff, Assessment Standards: Highest and Best
Use as a Basis for Land Appraisal and Assessment, in THE P.POPERTY TAX
AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 177-78 (A. Lynn, Jr. ed. paperback ed. 1969);
Yeates, The Effect of Zoning on Land Values in American Cities: A Case
Study, in ESSAYS IN GEOGRAPHY FOR AusTm MILLER 317 (J. Whitlow &
P. Wood eds. 1965). See generally T.N. Tideman, Three Approaches to
Improving Urban Land Use, (1969) (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Chicago).
190. See Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, Min-
istry of Works and Planning, Final Report, Presented by the Minister
of Works and Planning to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, Sep-
tember 1942, Cmd. 6386, at 14-16; Turvey, Development Charges and the
Compensation-Betterment Problem, 63 EcoN. J. 299 (1953).
191. See W. ALoNso, LOCATION AND LAND USE 117 (1964); A. ScmID,
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fects. The value transfer effect derives from the notion that a
particular tract of undeveloped land carries with it both a
present use value (for example, agricultural) and a component
of value equivalent to the discounted value of future develop-
ment for a particular more intensive use. Each tract carrying
the potential for more intensive development would then carry a
fraction of the total value of one tract developed for the more
intensive use. A decision to permit development of one of the
tracts for the more intensive use would have the effect of remov-
ing the now-reduced or eliminated potential value from the
tracts not granted development permission, while at the same
time conferring the total of the fractional values on the site
designated for development. Even a relatively efficient scheme
of zoning would have this effect, since it is the mere selection of
one among many competing sites for development that produces
the transfer effect, even if the existing consumer demand is for
one site only.
The supply-restrictive effects of givings derive both from
practical features that would be associated with any scheme of
zoning and from some of the worst exclusionary and prior
appropriation features of contemporary zoning. To the extent
that development permission is granted at a slower rate than the
consuming market demands, the value conferred on the selected
parcels will have a monopoly component. To some degree, this
effect seems both inevitable and even desirable. Existing con-
sumer preferences may fail to take into account problems of
future generations, especially with respect to environmental re-
sources. Such consumer preferences might well lead, if un-
checked, to more intense consumption of land for the present
than would be desirable if the interests of the future were taken
into account. In such a setting, those sites selected for develop-
ment are likely to reap an additional component of value, re-
flecting the real but not-to-be-satisfied demands. The same
effect would flow from a decision to hold back land supplies
released for development until a sufficient level of certainty ap-
peared with respect to the desired use, since the practical irre-
versibility of many land-use decisions might lead to a conclusion
that error on the side of overdevelopment for particular uses
would be more destructive of community goals. In fact, a more
generalized view of this phenomenon might lead to the conclusion
CONVERTING LAND FROM RURAL TO URBAN USES 37-39 (1968). See also
C. HAAR, LAND-UsE PLANNING 751-52 (2d ed. 1971).
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that any costs of development not perceived as such by the con-
suming public but nevertheless taken into account by public deci-
sionmakers are likely to be reflected in the values of sites released
for development. Other supply-restrictive effects are likely to re-
sult from human error in computing needs at a particular time.
If advance designation is deemed desirable to avoid the problems
of nuisance law, some error seems inevitable.
The worst supply-restrictive effects and, consequently, the
most extreme potentials for "givings" would seem to result from
the most unchecked and restrictive features of zoning practice.
The more that communities and individuals can appropriate for
themselves a higher degree of amenity, or a greater quantity of
spillover rights of exclusion, the less area will remain for more
intensive uses that are excluded. The smaller the area available
for such uses, the greater the potential premium for the lucky
landowner who receives the favorable designation. While it is
difficult to justify the conferral of values on the few lucky
developers permitted to develop for otherwise excluded uses,
their good fortune is simply a by-product of the basic exclusion-
ary scheme.
Similar value-conferral problems are produced by the im-
pacts of public improvements on the value of neighboring
land.1 92  Land development for particular purposes depends
largely on the availability and proximity of public improvements
and services-highways and roads, sewers, parks, schools, police
and fire protection, and utilities. These value effects, too, occur
both when public improvements are efficiently provided (in the
sense that services are provided at an adequate rate to accommo-
date demands for land having those services available) and
when they are undersupplied. If efficiency is assumed, the
effect will again be largely a transfer effect, in that prior to the
production of a particular improvement, numerous tracts carried
192. See Winnick, Development Values and Controls, in THE RE-
GIONAL CITY 125, 130 (D. Senior ed. 1966); Huber, Allocation of Rights
in Land: Preliminary Considerations, 50 IOWA L. Rnv. 279, 330 (1965);
Schmid, Suburban Land Appreciation and Public Policy, 36 J. AM. INST.
OF PLANNERs 38, 39, 41 (1970). For some empirical material, see Cough-
lin & Hammer, Estimating the Benefits of Stream Valley and Open Space
Preservation Projects, in GOVERMENT Sr'NDlNG AND LAND VALUES 155,
165-68 (C.L. Harriss ed. 1973); Darling, Measuring the Benefits Gener-
ated by Urban Water Parks, 49 LAND EcoN. 22 (1973); Weicher & Zerbst,
The Externalities of Neighborhood Parks: An Empirical Investigation,
49 LAND EcoN. 99 (1973); Weiss, Donnelly & Kaiser, Land Value and
Land Development Influence Factors: An Analytical Approach for
Examining Policy Alternatives, 42 LAND EcoN. 230 (1966).
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a component of potential value discounted for the probability of
timely provision of the particular public good (assuming of
course that the capitalized value of the service would exceed the
capitalized value of any taxes imposed in connection with its
provision). A decision to provide the service thereby localizes
the formerly diffuse potential value. Supply-restrictive effects
are also likely to occur, since for a number of reasons the
provision of services may not keep up with actual demands for
developable land. This may be the result of time lags in the
political process through which capital improvement decisions
are made, or the result of a single locality's unwillingness to
provide services to satisfy demand on the part of would-be
migrants to the local community from elsewhere in the area. It
may also be the result of the hesitancy of individuals to impose
additional taxes upon themselves. Such supply-restrictive ef-
fects further amplify the value increases that may be attributa-
ble to the provision of public services.
With respect to both broad categories of value effects-
those derived from regulatory decisions and those derived from
public improvements-there are reciprocal burden effects.
These burdens need not always equal the benefits created or
accompany every instance of value conferral. In the regulation
setting, the decreases are likely to be a product of loss of
potential value or, to the extent inefficiencies are present, a
product of exclusion from the restricted supply. In the public-
improvements setting, the value reductions will stem from the
fact that the new public improvement may be a substitute for, or
be in competition with, a previous public improvement that had
been capitalized into the value of other land, but whose pros-
pective abandonment will eliminate or reduce the former value
or produce a consumer shift away from previous public goods
that are now perceived as inferior. Or the new public good
itself may create practical restrictions on development for a
valuable use, as when a sewage treatment plant is built next
door, or an airport is located nearby, or partial highway access is
substituted for complete access.
All of these value reductions represent disappointed expec-
tations with respect to continuity of spillover rights. Whether
such burdens should be regarded as compensable losses would
depend upon the legitimacy of the expectations that have been
defeated. I have previously discussed these issues, and I need
repeat here only that whenever the burden, or denial, of spillover
rights interferes with previously distributed rights, causes a de-
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crease in residential amenity below the minimum standard, or
produces concededly inefficient results, the burden cannot be
regarded as legitimately imposed on the loser. In the case of
inefficiency, the loser deserves a chance, if practically possible,
to demonstrate the inefficiency of government choice. But
apart from those cases where the 'loser has a legitimate claim
with respect to the spillover denial, the losers may be regarded as
having never acquired the right to continuation of the claim in
the first place. In some of those cases, however, a separate
ethical problem is presented by the conferral of the value in-
crease, without charge, on some other lucky landowner while the
disappointed loser looks on. 193
The problem of "givings" is a serious one. The awesome
potential for benefit from planning and allocation of land uses
must inevitably corrupt the process. One need not be overly
cynical to assume that this potential will have an impact on the
regulatory process. Persons seeking to achieve gain and avoid
loss will undertake to protect their interests, even if only by
persuading decisionmakers to favor their tracts. But if, as
seems typical, there are often equally plausible alternatives for
decisionmakers to choose among, devices beyond rational argu-
ment are likely to appear. The larger and more frequent the
value-creating impact of the decision, the more likely that indi-
viduals will use extralegal or illegal means to achieve favored
status. Zoning has often been criticized for its tendency to-
ward corruption, 9 4 but how could it possibly operate other-
wise? And to the extent that its decisions are the product of
wealth and power, reinforcement of existing inequality is likely
to result.
Is there, then, any justificatiorn for failure to recoup the
land-value benefits conferred by government regulatory and lo-
cational decisions? One obvious category where recoupment
would not be mandated is where the impossibility or impractical-
ity of recoupment is at a level where the particular action, be it
regulatory or public improvement, could not be undertaken if
193. From a psychological perspective alone, the problem is one of
envy, which may be enough in itself to give rise to a serious social prob-
lem. See E. BECKER, EscAPE FROM EvIr 12 (1975). To the extent that
the choice of particular beneficiaries cannot be justified, even though the
system that produces the benefits and burdens can be, the psychological
phenomenon-envy-may become an ethical one-resentment. See J.
RAWLs, A THEORY OF JusTicE 530-41 (1971).




recoupment were required. Such might be the case where the
benefits are widely dispersed throughout society, or largely non-
monetizable (we cannot practically tax the future for current
environmental regulation, for example), or so minimal with
respect to each benefited individual that the cost of recoupment
would exceed the amount recouped. The line drawn by cur-
rent land-use law seems to fall far short of the limits of practi-
cality.19  In occasional eminent domain cases 96 and in a number
of recurring zoning situations, government action is struck down
because of the presence of inappropriate private benefit. The
usual test is whether the action in question has been taken for
the sole or dominant purpose of conferring a private benefit.11 7
Typical zoning cases in which this issue is raised are those
involving spot zoning, 9 8 where a previously barred, more inten-
sive use is authorized for a small area of land in an area
otherwise restricted to less intensive uses; or "negative" spot
zoning,199 where a small area is restricted to less intensive use
than permitted in the surrounding area, usually under circum-
stances where the owners of the surrounding land will receive
economic benefit from the restriction imposed on the complain-
ing landowner. A more generalized version of the second type
of case occurs where the ordinance is attacked as being con-
sciously designed to limit competition in a particular endeavor to
benefit those currently engaging in it.20 0 It is easy to understand
195. For some suggestions on extending recoupment practice up to
the limits of practicality, see, e.g., M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CON-
VERSION IN THE UNITED STATEs 185-86 (1971); Hagman, Windfalls for
Wipeouts, in THE GOOD EARTH OF AmERICA 109 (C.L. Harriss ed. 1974);
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75 (1973); Wexler, Betterment Recovery: A Financial Proposal for
Sounder Land-Use Planning, 3 YALE REV. OF L. & Soc. ACTION 192 (1973).
196. E.g., Port Authority v. Groppoli, 295 Minn. 1, 202 N.W.2d 371
(1972); Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 99 N.E.2d
235 (1951).
197. See Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The
Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19-23
(1971).
198. E.g., Damick v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 158 Conn. 78, 256
A.2d 428 (1969); Smith v. County of Washington, 241 Ore. 380, 406 P.2d
545 (1965); Pierce v. King County, 62 Wash. 2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963);
see Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 263 (1957).
199. E.g., Brandau v. City of Grosse Pointe Park, 5 Mich. App. 297,
146 N.W.2d 695 (1967); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118
N.W.2d 659 (1962); Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon,
307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
200. E.g., Ex parte White, 195 Cal. 516, 234 P. 396 (1925); Wyatt v.
City of Pensacola, 196 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Suburban Ready-
Mix Corp. v. Village of Wheeling, 25 Ill. 2d 548, 185 N.E.2d 665 (1962);
see 1 R. ANDERSON, A.mIucAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.28 (1968).
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judicial intolerance for the private benefit in these cases, inas-
much as such blatant abuses of collective resources strike direct-
ly at the very premises of collective action, presenting a situation
of exploitation of the many by the few.20 1 The difficult ques-
tion is whether the private benefit left unrecouped in cases where
it is incidental to public benefit can be ethically distinguished
from the cases of "pure" private benefit.
Should society in general or, more significantly, individuals
who are disappointed by government failure to confer valuable
spillover claims on them be willing to accept the conferral of
valuable spillover rights on others? If those rights are conferred
according to criteria of desert, such acceptance should be readily
obtainable. The criteria of desert that I have outlined would
support conferral without recoupment only to promote mini-
mum residential amenity. Otherwise, payment by beneficiaries
would be required where the only goal to be realized by regula-
tion was efficiency. Apart from the minimum residential amen-
ity goal and the limited recognition of prior appropriation claims
that I have suggested, the rationale for public intervention does
not justify the distributive results of that intervention.2 02
201. Cf. Michelman, supra note 18, at 1169 nL5, 1216-18.
202. One basis for justifying distribution of benefits outside the cri-
teria of desert would be an assumption of randomness in the conferral
of benefits. The analogy is to the factors that increase land value and
are not themselves the product of collective intervention, such as changes
in public taste, topographical features of the land, population, and migra-
tion decisions of individuals-in short, the ordinary market risks of land
ownership that tend to benefit some landowners and burden others. To
satisfy this model, however, government intervention would have to be
relatively unpredictable and beyond the control or influence of affected
landowners. But it seems difficult to imagine that even the land-use
intervention process is so perfectly irrational and intractable as to satisfy
such criteria.
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